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INTRODUCTION AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

Following the landmark 1961 decision of Monroe v. Pape,'
civil rights litigation, mostly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2 underwent a
vast expansion.3 As the number of claims against government offi1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monroe Chicago police had violated plaintiff's fourth
amendment rights by making a warrantless search and arrest at his home after midnight.
The United States Supreme Court held that citizens had a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982) against police officials who violated the Constitution while acting "under color
of" state law. The cause of action existed as a supplement to state law remedies and even if
these policemen were acting beyond the scope of their departmental authority.
Federal courts decided only nineteen § 1983 lawsuits from the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, the predecessor statute of § 1983, until 1936. The courts decided fewer
than 300 cases under § 1983 in 1960, the year before Monroe. See P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNdENT app. 1 at 199 (1983). The dramatic effect of Monroe, see infra note 3, was due to
previous restrictive interpretations of the fourteenth amendment, to the expansive dual
holding of the opinion itself, and to its historical position in the turbulent period of federalstate relations that developed during the desegregation struggles of the 1950's and 1960's.
See generally Steinglass, The Emerging State Court § 1983 Action: A ProceduralReview,
38 U. MIm L. Rav. 381, 389-93 (1984); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. R.v. 5,
5-7 (1980).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). This section provides in partEvery person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
A § 1983 claim is not available against a federal official because the statute authorizes
claims against persons who act "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia," not under color of federal law.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (emphasis added). A lawsuit that alleges deprivation of constitutional rights by a federal official is known as a Bivens action. In Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court implied a direct right of action
under the fourth amendment for a constitutional wrong by a federal official analogous to
that authorized by § 1983 for the comparable wrong by a state official in Monroe. Subsequent decisions implied similar Bivens-style claims against federal officers for deprivations
of other constitutional rights. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (eighth amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (fifth amendment).
3. Between 1961, the year of Monroe v. Pape, and 1983, the number of cases filed
annually under § 1983 and Bivens increased from about 500 to about 27,000 (data derived
by author from Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1961 Annual Report of
the Director,and from Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Judicial
Workload Statistics During the Twelve Month Period Ended Sept. 30, 1983). Most published data have overestimated the actual number of § 1983 cases by approximately 20%.
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cials increased during the 1960's and 1970's, concern mounted
among both judges and commentators that the rising volume of
litigation would outstrip the courts' management capabilities and
would hamper effective government.' The United States Supreme
Court in a series of decisions5 in the 1970's and early 1980's
Computation of these statistics must be inferred from other data because the official statistics do not identify § 1983 or Bivens cases as such.
Current reports subcategorize civil rights cases into three major groups: employmentrelated actions, prisoner petitions, and "other civil rights" cases. An empirical study performed in the Central District of California has demonstrated that the latter two statistical
categories are representative of § 1983 cases. See Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an EmpiricalStudy, 67 CORNuL L. REv. 482, 533-36 (1982) (comparing a firsthand survey of court filings with official data from the same district). Until the late 1970's
the official data did not routinely subcategorize civil rights actions. Earlier estimates of
§ 1983 caseloads based on total civil rights cases, therefore, overestimated the volume by 2025%. Compare id. with P. SCHUCK, supra note 1, app. 1 at 199-201 (higher estimate based
on total civil-rights claims) and Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction:A
FederalJudge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW &
Soc. ORD. 557, 563 (similarly basing estimate on total civil-rights claims).
The derived estimate for the year 1983 applies Eisenberg's findings to the official data.
Using these assumptions, a little fewer than one in three (about 26,000 of about 89,000)
private federal question cases commenced in 1983 were § 1983 actions. Cf. Whitman, supra
note 1, at 6 (similar estimate for 1976). About half of the § 1983 cases are prisoner in forma
pauperis petitions, which are screened especially for frivolousness under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
(1982). See Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of PrisonerSection 1983 Suits in the
Federal Courts, 92 HARv. L. Rav. 610, 618-20 (1979).
4. See, e.g., Aldisert, supra note 3, at 563 (a "deluge" of section 1983 cases); Edwards,
The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts: A CausationBased Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IowA L. REv. 871, 903-06
(1983); McCree, BureaucraticJustic: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 781-82 &
n.31 (1981) (calculating that between 1940 and 1980 the per-judge caseload in the district
courts nearly doubled while the per-judge caseload in the courts of appeals nearly tripled).
But see Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 526-38 (both quantitative and qualitative burdens on
courts of § 1983 cases have been exaggerated, and relatively low percentage of claims are
frivolous); Whitman, supra note 1, at 28 ("[C]aseload considerations are necessarily secondary to the vindication of [constitutional] rights.").
Several observers have made the point that, whatever one's ideological orientation, concern is appropriate that overburdened courts may give legitimate grievances short shrift.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 428-29 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black said:
My fellow Justices on this Court and our brethren throughout the federal judiciary
know only too well the time-consuming task of conscientiously poring over hundreds of
thousands of pages of factual allegations of misconduct by police, judicial, and corrections officials. Of course, there are instances of legitimate grievances, but. . . . [w]e sit
at the top of a judicial system accused by some of nearing the point of collapse.
Id.; see also Turner, supra note 3, at 638 n.144, 640 (meritorious cases sometimes buried;
assumptions that most cases are meritless can be "self-fulfilling prophesies"); Whitman,
supra note 1, at 26-30.
5. E.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981) (noting that environmental statutes providing express remedies supplant any otherwise available action under § 1983); City of Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247
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designed limits on civil rights actions in response to these concerns.6 One of the limiting doctrines was the development of "good
faith" or "qualified" immunity of executive branch government officials from liability for damages. With respect to qualified immunity, the Supreme Court has said that courts should apply the
same standards in claims against state or local officials under section 1983 as in claims against federal officials in actions authorized
by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.7
Qualified immunity has its roots in the good faith defense
available at common law8 to a police officer defending against a
suit for false arrest. In Pierson v. Ray' the Supreme Court first
announced the availability of an analogous defense to police officers sued under section 1983 for violating the Constitution by
falsely arresting a group of clergymen protesting racial segregation.
Subsequent cases expanded the availability of the defense to other
executive officers, 10 and a two-prong test" evolved to determine
(1981) (punitive damages not available against defendant municipality); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (stating that comity and federalism bar federal court injunction
against civil as well as criminal proceeding in which plaintiff may vindicate constitutional
rights).
These cases were countervailing against another trend in § 1983 cases that widened the
scope of relief available to plaintiffs. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (§ 1983
protects both federal statutory rights and constitutional rights; subsequent Sea Clammers
decision, however, blunted impact of decision); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978) (municipality not immune from suit under certain conditions; subsequent
City of Newport decision, however, blunted impact of decision); Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225 (1972) (federal anti-injunction act not applicable in § 1983 cases; subsequent Trainor and other decisions blunted impact of decision). A series of cases expanding the protection of the fourteenth amendment by selective incorporation of aspects of the Bill of Rights
also extended the sweep of § 1983. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
6. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (barring prisoner's fourteenth
amendment claim for deprivation of property without due process of law when an adequate
state tort remedy existed; to hold otherwise would create "a font of tort law"); Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). See generally Nahmod, The
Mounting Attack on Section 1983 and the 14th Amendment, 67 A.BA. J. 1586 (1981); Note,
Federalism, Section 1983 and State Law Remedies: Curtailing the Federal Civil Rights
Docket by Restricting the Underlying Right, 43 U. Pxr. L. REV. 1035 (1982).
7. 403 U.S. 388 (1971); see Davis v. Scherer, 104 S. Ct. 3012, n.12 (1984); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.30 (1982).
8. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 10, 121 (1965); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 497 (1978) (immunity from
§ 1983 liability "not constitutionally grounded and essentially a matter of statutory
construction").
9. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
10. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (state governor); Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975) (local school board members); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)
(state hospital superintendent; the Court described qualified immunity as available to "state
officials"). In Harlow the Court described its formulation of qualified immunity after Wood
as a "general statement of the qualified immunity standard." 457 U.S. at 815 n.25.
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whether qualified immunity was appropriate. Under this test, an
official would receive immunity only if his actions demonstrated
both objective reasonableness and subjective good faith. The subjective prong of the "objective-subjective" test proved to be highly
fact-intensive; often either trial or extensive discovery was necessary before courts could resolve the issue.1 2 In 1982, after the lower
courts had failed to heed two earlier suggestions that they employ
greater use of summary judgment to strengthen the protection that
qualified immunity affords government officials, 13 the Supreme
4 the
Court took more prescriptive action. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald1
Court eliminated the "subjective" prong of the qualified immunity
test and declared that the district courts, to effect the quick termination of insubstantial claims, should seek to resolve the issue of
qualified immunity on summary judgment without antecedent
discovery.
The Harlow Court both altered the substantive law of qualified immunity and established a procedural goal for implementing
the defense. 15 This Note will focus primarily on the procedural aspects of the decision. In the three years that have elapsed since
Harlow, lower courts have struggled to carry out the Supreme
Court's directive to resolve the qualified immunity issue, if possible, on summary judgment. As a consequence, three distinct but
11. The Court in Wood v. Strickland announced:
[An official] is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [person] affected, or if he took the
action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or
other injury ....
420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). Although the phrase "knew or should have known" appears to mix
subjective and objective factors, the Court in Harlow described it as an "objective element
involv[ing] a presumptive knowledge of and respect for 'basic, unquestioned constitutional
rights,'" reserving the subjective component to the final clause dealing with "'permissible
intentions.'" 457 U.S. at 815 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 322).
12. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-17.
13. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 250 (1974).
14. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
15. The terms "substantive" and "procedural" here are used in the sense of "the familiar notion that the rules of substantive law define the rights and duties of persons in
their ordinary relations with each other or with the body politic, while procedural rules
govern the decisional forms whereby these rights may be maintained or redressed." F. JAMEs
& G. HAZARD, CIVM PROCEDURE § 1.1, at 1 (2d ed. 1977). However, "every legal procedure

.. . manifests a substantive policy decision, a choice to weight the coin on one side or another." Wexler & Effron, Burden of Proof and Cause of Action, 29 McGmL L.J. 468, 470
(1984).
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interrelated areas of procedural uncertainty have become manifest.
First, what are the outer bounds of the ban on factual inquiry into
an official's subjective state of mind? Second, which party, plaintiff
or defendant, should bear the burden of proof on the issue of qualified immunity? Last, if the district court denies summary judgment to officials claiming qualified immunity, should officials be
able to appeal the adverse decision immediately?
In addressing these areas of uncertainty, this Note will focus
on Harlow's stated goal of the quick termination of insubstantial
claims. This Note will emphasize that this procedural goal is not
merely a logical consequence of Harlow's substantive holding, but
also a means to maintain a fair balance between Harlow's competing substantive policies of (1) providing for the vindication of meritorious constitutional claims and (2) protecting governmental and
judicial efficiency.
In part 1116 this Note will present in greater detail the key
holdings of the Harlow opinion and its overall policy orientation.
Part III will identify the ways in which lower courts have differed
in their reading of Harlow on these three procedural questions; it
will reexamine the questions in light of the policies underlying
both the Harlow opinion and the relevant procedural vehicles-summary judgment, discovery, burdens of proof, and appealability of decisions. Part III, section A will focus on the scope of
subjective discovery permissible before summary judgment,1" section B on the allocation of the burden of proof,18 and section C on
the appealability of summary judgment denial.' 9 The Note also
will analyze the effect of the recent Mitchell v. Forsyth0 decision
not only on appealability but also on the interdependent issues of
discovery and burden of proof.2 ' In conclusion, this Note will propose that the federal courts can best implement the balance of policies inherent in Harlow v. Fitzgerald by a coordinated approach
of (1) permitting limited and sometimes supervised discovery
before summary judgment, (2) placing upon plaintiffs the burden
of proving that the law protecting their rights was clearly established at the time of the asserted violation, and (3) limiting the use
of automatic immediate appeal by defendants denied summary
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See
See
See
See
105
See

infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
S. Ct. 2806
infra notes

22-36 and accompanying text.
37-98 and accompanying text.
99-145 and accompanying text.
146-253 and accompanying text.
(1985).
202-36 and accompanying text.
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judgment, but permitting them enhanced use of certified interlocutory appeal.

II.
A.

THE

Harlow OPINION

AND ITS POLICIES

Substantive Holding and ProceduralDirections

In Harlow the Supreme Court both recast the substantive elements of and specified a three-step procedure for implementing
the qualified immunity defense.2 2 In substantive terms, the Court
catalogued the weaknesses of the subjective prong of the Wood v.
Strickland23 qualified immunity test and declared that "bare allegations of malice" 24 no longer would suffice to subject officials to
trial or to burdensome discovery. The new test would rely on the
"objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by
22. Lower courts often quote the following two paragraphs from the Harlow opinion:
[W]e conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject
government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching
discovery. We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by
reference to clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government
and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment. On
summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be
said to "know" that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If the
law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can
prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the
defense should be sustained. But again, the defense would turn primarily on objective
factors.
457 U.S. at 817-19 (citations and footnotes omitted).
23. 420 U.S. 308 (1975); see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
The Court noted that the subjective element of the Wood v. Strickland good-faith defense "ha[d] proved incompatible with our admonition in [Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478
(1978)] that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial" because under FED. R. Civ. P.
56 courts had considered subjective good faith a question of fact requiring jury resolution.
457 U.S. at 815-16. As a result, officials had been subjected "to the risks of trial-distraction
. . . from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of
able people from public service." Id. at 816. Courts also had subjected officials to "peculiarly
disruptive" discovery of their subjective motivations because "the judgments surrounding
discretionary action almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker's experiences,
values, and emotions." Id. at 816.
24. 457 U.S. at 817.
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'25
reference to clearly established law."
The Court then laid out the following sequential inquiries by
which a district judge would apply the new objective test: (1) What
is the applicable federal law whose protection the plaintiff lost
when the official undertook the complained-of conduct? (2) Was
that law clearly established at the time of the asserted violation?
(3) Even if the applicable law was clearly established at the time of
the violation, has the official shown that because of extraordinary
circumstances he neither knew nor should have known of the rele26
vant legal standard?

B. A Balance of Policies
The Harlow Court viewed qualified immunity as a compromise
between competing values.2 7 At one extreme, the Court recognized
25. Id. at 818.
26. Id. at 818-19. Courts applying Harlow often have described this analysis as a twopart inquiry, collapsing the factual and legal formulation of step (1) into step (2), while
leaving the "extraordinary circumstances" issue as the final step. Other courts, however,
have more clearly separated the initial step. Compare Batiste v. Burke, 746 F.2d 257, 260
n.3 (5th Cir. 1984) (two-part test: (1) Was the law clearly established? (2) Were there extraordinary circumstances?) and Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (bipartite test: (1) whether the right alleged to have been violated was well-established;
(2) whether the defendant reasonably should have known of its existence), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 1843 (1985) with Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Once an
official's conduct has been ascertained,the determinative question will be what rules were
'clearly established.' ") (emphasis added) and Skevofilax v. Quigley, 586 F. Supp. 532, 538
(D.N.J. 1984) ("whether the law with respect to the conduct in question is settled" (emphasis added)).
27. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813-14. Drawing on its earlier discussions in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the Court described
qualified immunity as "the best attainable accommodation of competing values"--"a balance between the evils inevitable in any available alternative." 457 U.S. at 813-14.
Judge Learned Hand issued the classic statement of this tradeoff:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his
powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected
with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and,
if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be
monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to
know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the
inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute,
or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and again
the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in
the face of which an official may later find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his
good faith. . . As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between
the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end
better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those
who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.

1985]

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

1551

the need to provide a "realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees ' 2 and to deter officials from committing constitutional wrongs. 29 At the other extreme, the Court recognized "the
need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.

30

According to the Court, absolute im-

munity would go to one extreme by promoting violations of
constitutional guarantees, while no immunity would go to the other
extreme by opening the door to the impairment of effective government. The Court placed great emphasis on the costs to government of civil rights lawsuits: the fact that claims "frequently run
against the innocent as well as the guilty,"3' the expense of litigation, the diversion of official energy, the deterrence of able citizens
from seeking public office, and the threat that cowed officials
3' 2
might shy away from "the unflinching discharge of their duties.
In relying on qualified immunity as the best compromise between these extremes, the Court assumed that "[i]nsubstantial
lawsuits [could] be quickly terminated. 3' The Court detailed its
34
concerns about the costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial
and the "peculiarly disruptive" effect of extensive discovery on
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). One
commentator has capsulized Judge Hand's rationale into three principal arguments favoring
the expansion of qualified immunity- (1) It is unfair to penalize an official for wrong decisions when he has a duty to make decisions; (2) lack of immunity could deter both the
recruitment and the disinterested performance of capable public officials; and (3) the threat
of prosecution could distract official attention from public duties. See Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations:An Analysis and a Critique,72 Nw. U.L. REV.
526, 528-30 (1977).
28. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
29. Id. at 819.
30. Id. at 807 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 506).
31. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814. But see Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 536-38 (noting, from
empirical study, that "large majority" of nonprisoner cases asserted important interests and
many prisoner cases were "not plainly trivial"); Turner, supra note 3, at 638 n.144 (assumption of frivolousness a self-fulfilling prophecy).
32. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d at 581); cf. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 526-33 (empirical study showed burden of litigation actually less than
thought and financial recovery minimal); Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88
YALE L.J. 781, 809-14 (1979) (noting that litigation had little impact on departmental behavior because most police defendants are indemnified); Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The
Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 281,
307-15 (arguing that fear of litigation promotes self-protective and risk-avoiding behavior,
but actual extent unknowable).
33. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 437 U.S. at 507-08). Justice
Powell, author of the Harlow majority opinion, stressed that "[t]he importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis." Id. at 814 n.23.
34. Id. at 816.
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government efficiency.3 5 Finally, the Court noted that although
public policy mandated the adoption of an objective "good faith"
standard that would permit the resolution of many insubstantial
claims on summary judgment, the new test, nonetheless, would
provide "no license to lawless conduct" and would continue to furnish protection for constitutional rights. 6
III. PROCEDURAL
A.
1.

FAIRNESS AFTER

Harlow

Discovery of Subjective Facts
An Absolute Ban on Discovery?

By "defining the limits of qualified immunity essentially in objective terms,"3 7 the Harlow majority expressed a strong preference
for resolving the qualified immunity issue on summary judgment
and for avoiding discovery. The Court, however, did not state this
preference in absolute terms. The Court held that officials "generally" would be shielded from liability for civil damages "insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established . . . rights of
which a reasonable person would have known. '3 The Court also
stated that the "extraordinary circumstances" defense, the third
step of the three-step inquiry, would "turn primarily on objective
35. Id. at 817. On this point the Court relied upon and quoted extensively from Judge
Gerhard Gesell's concurring opinion in Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1214-15 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), aff'd in part and dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981). See 457 U.S. at 817
n.29. Judge Gesell had proposed to deal with the problem by establishing a postdiscovery
pretrial screening procedure at which plaintiff would be given the burden of establishing
"not merely the existence of a genuine dispute as to some material issue of fact but also, by
the preponderance of the evidence or through clear and convincing evidence, that the official

failed to act with subjective or objective good faith." 606 F.2d at 1215. The defendantspetitioners in Harlow urged the Court to accept this approach; the majority, however, chose
to develop the new objective test, even though this proposal had not been briefed or carefully considered at oral argument. See The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARv. L. REv. 4,
234-35 & nn. 65-66 (1982).
36. 457 U.S. at 819. The Court stated:
The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims
remains protected by a test that focuses on the objective reasonableness of an official's
acts. Where an official could be expected to know that certain conduct would violate
statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate; and a person who
suffers injury caused by such conduct may have a cause of action. But where an official's duties legitimately require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by action taken "with independence
and without fear of consequences."
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
37. 457 U.S. at 819.
38. Id. at 818 (emphasis added). For fuller text, see supra note 22.
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factors."3' 9 Moreover, the Court inserted the ban on discovery after
discussing inquiries (1) and (2), but before discussing inquiry (3).4 0
The Court made specific reference to rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in explaining the rationale for eliminating
the "subjective" prong of the qualified immunity test.4 1 The Court
also pointed out that it had advocated greater use of summary
judgment on qualified immunity issues twice before, in Scheuer v.
Rhodes and Butz v. Economou. 4 2 In discussing the drawbacks of
investigating officials' subjective intent, the Court assumed that
discovery would be "broad-ranging" and "broad-reaching" into the
thought processes and judgments of the official as well as into the
factors that influence those judgments and processes. These "experiences, values and emotions . . .frame a background in which
'4 3
there often is no clear end to the relevant evidence.
As lower courts have sought to implement the new objective
standard for qualified immunity," the effect of Harlow's ban on
39. Id. at 818-19 (emphasis added).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 816 & n.26.
42. Id. at 807-08, 819 n.35; see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
43. Id. at 816-17.
44. See Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement the New Standard for Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 901 (1984). The most
difficult problem for the courts has been to determine the degree of factual correspondence
required between the case law establishing a legal standard and the case under consideration. This issue is critically important because the higher the degree of factual correspondence the courts require the less likely the court will find that the matching legal principle
was clearly established. By the same token, courts are more prone to consider that a broad
legal principle was clearly established. Commentators have suggested three general approaches: (1) to require strict factual correspondence between the precedent case and the
instant case; (2) to require that officials apply general legal principles in analogous factual
situations; or (3) to require that officials anticipate discernible trends in the law. See id. at
923-32. One court has criticized the first approach as a "one bite" rule. Hixon v. Durbin, 560
F. Supp. 654, 665 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Another court has commented:
It is. . .clear that the right at issue can be defined neither so broadly as to parrot the
language of the Bill of Rights, nor so narrowly as to require that there be no distinguishing facts between the instant case and existing precedent. The former reading of
Harlow would, of course, undermine the premise of qualified immunity that the Government actors reasonably should know that their conduct is problematic. The latter
reading, on the other hand, would unquestionably turn qualified into absolute immunity by requiring immunity in any new fact situation. In future cases, courts will of
course work through the area between these extremes . . ..
Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 1843 (1985).
In the recent case of Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985), the Court appeared to
follow the middle course. Discussing uncertainty and lower court conflicts in the late 1960's
and early 1970's about whether warrantless wiretappings for national security purposes were
unconstitutional, the Court said:
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the use of discovery has become uncertain. The Court had discarded the subjective prong of the good faith test and directed that
discovery "should not be allowed" until the lower court resolves
the threshold test of immunity. 45 The Court, however, failed to indicate whether it intended the ban on discovery to be absolute.
Subsequent cases have revealed a persistent need for some discovery before summary judgment.
2. Persistence of Subjective Inquiries
Frequently the need for discovery is apparent when the court
holds that the applicable law was clearly established 46 at the time
of the incident, but a defendant official then claims that because of
extraordinary circumstances he neither knew nor should have
known of the relevant legal standard. Harlow, in its majority and
concurring opinions, gave ambiguous directions about whether discovery would be appropriate into the nature of these exculpating
circumstances, including the official's state of knowledge of the relevant law. 47 Lower courts have attempted to resolve this ambiguity
by using objective factors in a given case when they were available,
and by denying summary judgment in cases when the objective
factors were not available. Objective factors that the courts have
We do not intend to suggest that an official is always immune from liability or suit for
a warrantless search merely because the warrant requirement has never explicitly been
held to apply to a search conducted in identical circumstances. But in cases where
there is a legitimate question whether an exception to the warrant requirement exists,
it cannot be said that a warrantless search violates clearly established law.
Id. at 2820 n.12.
45. 457 U.S. at 818-19. See supra notes 11 & 22 and accompanying text, for descriptions of the old subjective-objective test and of the new objective test for qualified
immunity.
46. Step (2) of the three-step Harlow inquiry, supra text accompanying note 26.
47. 457 U.S. at 818. Justice Powell, for the majority, said that this defense would "turn
primarily on objective factors." Id. at 819. Justice Brennan, however, concurring with two
other justices, said that he agreed with the majority's substantive standard but thought it
"inescapable. . . that some measure of discovery may sometimes be required to determine
exactly what a public-official defendant did 'know' at the time of his actions." Id. at 820-21
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan said that erecting an "impenetrable barrier" to a
plaintiff's discovery "when defendants themselves are prone to assert their goo[d flaith"
would be unfair. Id. at 821 (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979)); see
Skevofilax v. Quigley, 586 F. Supp. 532, 538 (D.N.J. 1984) (noting that the Brennan concurrence "explicated" the majority view on this point); Heslip v. Lobbs, 554 F. Supp. 694, 70102 & n.6 (E.D. Ark. 1982) ("It is apparent. . . that Harlow. . . clearly allows a court at this
juncture to evaluate the defendant's subjective beliefs in addition to objective factors.") (citation omitted); see also Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 IowA L. REv. 1, 7 n.53 (1982) (arguing that an official's actual knowledge in cases
when the law is clearly established is still relevant after Harlow).
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used to resolve exceptional-circumstances claims have included an
official's reliance on legal advice, 8 reliance on a statute,49 the notice-giving effect of a legal judgment,50 and the recentness of a
judgment that clearly established the relevant law."' In the absence
of a determinative "objective" factor, however, the lower courts
generally have concluded that an exceptional-circumstances claim
raises subjective matters appropriate for fact-finding at trial.52
Considerably more troublesome have been cases in which a
plaintiff desired to make a factual inquiry into an official's state of
mind during step (1) of the Harlow three-step inquiry. In these
cases, the district courts have had to make two related determinations: (1) the law to apply and (2) the factual setting to which the
law will apply.53 To the degree that the court views an official's
state of mind as an integral part of Harlow's "threshold inquiry,"
the court will bar discovery.5 4 If the court, however, views an offi48. See Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971, 981-82 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that
advance consultation with assistant U.S. attorney proved that arresting agents had objective
good faith); Keefe v. Library of Congress, 588 F. Supp. 778, 792 (D.D.C. 1984); Wells v.
Dallas Indep. School Dist., 576 F. Supp. 497, 508-09 (N.D. Tex. 1983); Zook v. Brown, 575 F.
Supp. 72, 77 (C.D. Ill. 1983) ("If an attorney cannot determine that the law forbids certain
government action, it cannot be found that individuals untrained in the nuances of constitutional law should have known. . . ."), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 748 F.2d 1161,
1165 (7th Cir. 1984); cf. Dehorty v. New Castle County Council, 560 F. Supp. 889, 893-94 &
n.13 (D. Del. 1983) (affidavit of attorney that she did not advise officials of relevant law
insufficient to establish objective good faith). As with courts utilizing other objective factors,
these courts did not always label attorney advice as an "extraordinary circumstance" but
did use the attorney's advice as objective evidence of good faith.
49. See King v. City of Fort Wayne, 590 F. Supp. 414, 424-26 (N.D. Ind. 1984); see
also Casto, Innovations in the Defense of Official Immunity Under Section 1983, 47 TENN.
L. REv. 47, 96-97 (1979) (noting that an official may reasonably rely on the constitutionality
of a statute).
50. See Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1385-86 (11th Cir. 1982) (concluding that
judgment in earlier litigation involving same state prison system put officials on notice of
ongoing constitutional violations), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 335 (1983).
51. See Arebaugh v. Dalton, 730 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir. 1984) (controlling Supreme
Court decision only 12 days before incident; court considered the possibility but did not
decide whether to exculpate officials); cf. Muzychka v. Tyler, 563 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 (E.D.
Pa. 1983) (controlling Supreme Court decision three weeks before incident; possible exculpatory effect of recentness not considered).
52. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 26-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Losch v. Borough of
Parkesburgh, 736 F.2d 903, 910 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1984); McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309,
324 & n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
53. See supra notes 26, 44 and accompanying text; see also Muzychka v. Tyler, 563 F.
Supp. 1061, 1066 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (denying summary judgment to police officers accused of
an illegal search in violation of clearly established law when there were "conflicting versions
of what defendants actually did").
54. See, e.g., Donahoe v. Watt, 546 F. Supp. 753, 756 (D.D.C. 1982), af/'d mem., 713
F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Criticizing this approach, the court in Dale v. Bartels, 552 F.
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cial's state of mind as a critical feature of the relevant factual setting rather than an element of good faith, then the door to discovery might swing ajar. 5 In a number of cases after Harlow the lower
federal courts have drawn this distinction and have identified unresolved factual issues concerning an official's state of mind requiring either additional discovery or denial of summary judgment.
These states of mind have concerned intention, purpose, knowledge, and recklessness.

56

In Nakao v. Rushen 57 the district court denied summary judgment to officials who conducted a warrantless search of a prisoner's
cell and mail. Defendants claimed that the need for prison security
made the search justifiable; plaintiff alleged that the officials' real
purpose was to assist other nonprison officials in a job-related investigation of the prisoner's wife. The court held that "a rational
jury might conclude that the search. . . did not serve a justifiable
purpose [and, therefore,] violated clearly established law."'58 In

Gannon v. Daley59 administrative assistants in a state prosecutor's
office alleged that officials had fired them because of the assistants
political affiliation, violating their first amendment rights under
Branti v. FinkelY' The defendant officials admitted that they were

Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), modified, 732 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1984), said:
[R]easonableness of challenged intentional conduct is not the sort of issue which can be
resolved by affidavit, especially in suits in which there has been no pre-trial discovery.
In suggesting that such a finding may be made at an early stage in the typical Bivens
case, the Harlow opinion flies in the face of longstanding authority to the
contrary ....
Id. at 1266 n.1.
55. See Smith v. Nixon, 582 F. Supp. 709, 712, 714 (D.D.C. 1984) ("conduct" still appropriate for factual inquiry after Harlow; "subjective motivation" and "intention" not
appropriate).
56. See infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
57. 545 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
58. Id. at 1093. In light of Harlow, the Nakao court expressly reconsidered its preHarlow denial of qualified immunity on summary judgment on the same evidence. Nakao v.
Rushen, 542 F. Supp. 856 (N.D. Cal. 1982). After fuller discovery, the court again denied
qualified immunity to defendants and granted plaintiffs partial summary judgment on the
issue of liability, holding that the search was "without reference to any justifiable purpose of
imprisonment or prison security." Nakao v. Rushen, 580 F. Supp. 718, 722-23 (N.D. Cal.
1984).
Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984), would now appear to bar Nakao's claim. In
Hudson the Court held that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their
cells. Id. at 3200. According to the Court, the fourth amendment provides no protection
from cell searches. Id. The Court also held that a prisoner has no fourteenth amendment
claim for deprivation of property when an adequate state remedy exists, even if, as in
Nakao, the officials act intentionally. See id. at 3202-04.
1983).
59. 561 F. Supp. 1377 (N.D. Ill.
60. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
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aware of the applicable law, but said that they reasonably believed
that it did not apply to the plaintiffs. The court denied summary
judgment and set the case for trial, noting that there were unresolved issues of fact regarding (1) the nature of the employees'
duties, and (2) whether the defendants should have known that the
rule of Branti protected the employees.6 1 Drawing a similar distinction in another case concerning a politically motivated discharge, the court in Dehorty v. New Castle County Council62 also
denied a summary judgment for the defendant officials. The
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit used analogous
reasoning to reverse the grant of a motion to dismiss in National
Black Police Association, Inc. v. Velde, 63 in which plaintiffs alleged that officials had allowed use of federal funds to support local law enforcement agencies that were accused of discriminating
against individuals based on race and sex. The court held that discovery was appropriate and permitted both subjective and objective inquiries into whether defendant officials "knew or should
have known" that particular local agencies were discriminating.
The courts deemed these inquiries consistent with the purpose of
qualified immunity and "not inconsistent with Harlow.' '64
The courts in Nakao, Gannon, Dehorty, and Velde made an
implicit distinction between (1) a permissible inquiry into an official's state of mind to establish whether a violation of plaintiff's
constitutional rights had occurred,6 5 and (2) an inquiry no longer
permissible after Harlow to establish a lack of subjective good
faith and thereby to defeat qualified immunity. However, in Smith
61. 561 F. Supp. at 1388 & n.32. The court noted: "[Tihis case shows that the immunity defense will, even under Harlow, sometimes present issues of fact." Id. at 1388 n.32.
62. 560 F. Supp. 889 (D. Del. 1983). The court said that "[i]n the absence of a factual
record [it was] unable to determine whether the defendants knew or should have known
that their alleged conduct with respect to the plaintiff would violate the constitutional norm

.... " Id. at 893-94 (footnote omitted). Although the Dehorty court's use of the "knew or
should have known" phrase sounds at first like a Harlow step (3) inquiry, the court also said
that the defendants had "offered no extraordinary circumstances to show that they should
not have known" of the relevant law. Id. at 893. The court, thus, apparently formulated the

issue of whether the defendants "knew or should have known" that the relevant law applied
to the plaintiffs as a Harlow step (1) inquiry.
63. 712 F.2d 569 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2180 (1984).
64. Id. at 582-83. The applicability of Harlow principles was squarely before the D.C.

Circuit. The Supreme Court in an earlier judgment in Velde had vacated and remanded the
case to the circuit court "for further consideration in light of Harlow v. Fitzgerald."Velde v.
National Black Police Ass'n, Inc., 458 U.S. 591 (1982) (citation omitted).
65. See also McGee v. Hester, 724 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that the jury should
determine whether the ruin of plaintiff's business by overzealous state liquor agents was

intentional).
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v. Nixon, 66 in which a Washington reporter alleged officials had
tapped his telephone for illegal political purposes rather than for
valid national security purposes, the district court refused to allow
discovery into defendant officials' motivations for ordering the tap
and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court
acknowledged that an analytical distinction could be drawn between the "purpose" of the tap-an issue of conduct and therefore
proper for inquiry-and the "motive" behind the tap-an issue of
subjective good faith and therefore improper. The court stated,
however, that as a practical matter, proper deposition questions
concerning "purpose" or "rationale" would not be separable from
improper inquiries into "motive." The court granted defendants
summary judgment on the ground that the "objective record,"
without further discovery, revealed a "rational" basis for the officials' asserted proper motivation. 7
3.

State of Mind and Summary Judgment

Harlow's procedural goal-the quick termination of insubstantial claims 6 -is virtually identical to the central purpose that underlies the vehicle of summary judgment.6 e Although the Harlow
Court certainly changed the substantive standard by which a court
70
is to assess a claim of qualified immunity at summary judgment,
the Court gave no indication that it intended to modify the procedural operation of rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce66. 582 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C. 1984).
67. Id. at 714-15. The court said that it would require defendants to produce "some
documentation" of the wiretap to show that "a basis for rational national security concerns"
existed. The court, however, emphasized the opinion of another court in the same district in
a similar wiretapping case, which stated that the Harlow opinion precluded further inquiry
into whether national security was "the actual or the only reason for defendant's conduct."
Id. at 714 (quoting Ellsberg v. Mitchell, No. 1979-72, slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. July 22, 1983)
(emphasis in Smith court's opinion)). The Smith court said its solution was a "workable, if
not entirely elegant, solution to the problems presented in 'improper purpose' wiretap cases
after Harlow . . . .[B]ut. . .Harlow's insistence on 'objective' criteria and the 'social costs'
of immunity litigation mandate the approach . . . ." 582 F. Supp. at 715.
68. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
69. "The very mission of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings
and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Notes of
Advisory Committee on Rules-1963 Amendment, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. at 626 (1982).
In Richard v. Credit Suisse, 242 N.Y. 346, 152 N.E. 110 (1926), Judge Cardozo said, "The
very object of a motion for summary judgment is to separate what is formal or pretended in
denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial, so that only the latter may subject
a suitor to the burden of a trial." Id. at 350, 152 N.E. at -.
70. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
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dure. 71 Commentators on federal summary judgment practices
often have criticized as ad hoc and unprincipled the courts' tendencies toward highly specific judgments adapted to the peculiar
facts of each case. 72 These commentators have argued that closer
judicial attention to the wording and structure of rule 56 would
produce more uniform and sound results. 73 Qualified immunity
cases also could benefit by increased attention to rule 56.
On summary judgment, courts view the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all inferences in
that party's favor. 74 Although some courts have placed special em71. See Douglas v. Galloway, 568 F. Supp. 966, 971 (S.D.W. Va. 1983) ("Harlow...
did not change the operation of Rule 56 in immunity cases."), aff'd in part and dismissed in
part sub nom. England v. Rockefeller, 739 F.2d 140 (4th Cir. 1984); McSurely v. McClellan,
697 F.2d 309, 321 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1982); cf. Smith v. Nixon, 582 F. Supp. 709, 713-14 (D.D.C.
1984) ("At the very least it can be said that Harlow renders certain facts no longer 'material'
within the meaning of Rule 56: 'subjective motivation' and 'intention' are of no legal significance after Harlow and may not be the subject of inquiry."); see also supra text accompanying notes 41-42 (Harlow Court citing rule 56 in opinion).
part:
Rule 56 provides in pertinent
(c) MOTION AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON.... The adverse party prior to the day of
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law...

(e)

FORM OF AFFIDAVITS; FURTHER TESTIMONY; DEFENSE REQUIRED ....

When a motion

for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) WHEN AFFIDAVITS ARE UNAVAILABLE. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e), (f).
72. See Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE
L.J. 745, 746 (1974); Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining
Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 466-67 (1983). See generally Bauman, A
Rationale of Summary Judgment, 33 IND. L.J. 467 (1958) (discussing the role of summary
judgment); Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MINN. L. REV. 567 (1952) (discussing the
purpose and usefulness of summary judgment).
73. See Schwarzer, supra note 72, at 467-68 ("anecdotal jurisprudence . . . niggardly
application of rule 56"); Sonenshein, State of Mind and Credibility in the Summary Judgment Context: A Better Approach, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 774, 774-80, 810 (1983) ("a plea for
federal courts to simply apply Rule 56, as it was designed to be applied, to every kind of
case").
74. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962), cited in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 816 n.26. Post-Harlow courts generally have continued to endorse
this view. See, e.g., Muzychka v. Tyler, 563 F. Supp. 1061, 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Dehorty v.
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phasis 75 on the language of rule 56 requiring that no "genuine issue
as to any material fact"' 6 exist for judgment to issue, commentators have urged that courts require a party moving for summary
judgment to satisfy only approximately the same evidentiary standard as one moving for a directed verdict. 77 The moving party, in
other words, should show that the opposing party would not have
enough evidence to convince a reasonable jury of his view on any
factual issue material to the case.78 Whatever the evidentiary standard generally adopted, however, courts traditionally have been reluctant to grant summary judgment when the moving party is peculiarly in possession of relevant evidence or when other
circumstances limit the nonmoving party's access to discovery of
relevant evidence.7 9 These considerations underlie the oft-quoted
rule of thumb that summary judgment is usually inappropriate in
cases in which a party's state of mind is at issue.80
In Harlow the Supreme Court attempted to circumvent evidentiary problems concerning state of mind by excising subjective
good faith from the threshold test for qualified immunity.8 ' Many
post-Harlow lower courts, 2 nonetheless, have persisted in allowing
subjective inquiries. This persistence, however, may not pose a
great threat to the Harlow goal.
New Castle County Council, 560 F. Supp. 889, 894 n.14 (D. Del. 1983); see also Donohoe v.
Watt, 546 F. Supp. 753, 756 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem., 713 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
75. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 156 (1970); United States v.
Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); 6 J. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE T 56.15[1.-0]
n.3 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE] and cases cited therein.
At times this emphasis has led courts to withhold summary judgment if they had the
"slightest doubt" whether the movant was entitled to judgment. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 99, at 666 (4th ed. 1983) ("a rather misleading gloss" on the rule language); Sonenshein, supra note 73, at 777.
76.

FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). For fuller text, see supra note 71.

77. E.g., Currie, Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U. CH.
L. REV. 72, 76-79 (1977); Sonenshein, supra note 73, at 783-86; see also Cooper, Directions
for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MINN. L. REv. 903 (1971).
78.

See Cooper, supra note 77, at 918-27.

79. See 6 MOORE'S

FEDERAL PRACTICE,

supra note 75, at l 56.1515].

80. E.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) ("[S]ummary
procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent
play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile
witnesses thicken the plot."); Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1329 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978).
81.

See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.

82.

See supra notes 46-65 and accompanying text.
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Proposals for Limited Subjective Discovery

The Harlow opinion apparently contemplated subjective inquiry into whether an official "neither knew nor should have
known" the relevant law because of "extraordinary circumstances"-step (3) of the Harlow three-step inquiry. 3 A district
court will reach this inquiry only after a determination that the
law protecting the plaintiff's rights was clearly established at the
time of the incident. The plaintiff's claim must have survived the
"clearly established" test of steps (1) and (2). Subjective inquiry,
thus, will be limited to a selected subset of cases. In any event, the
defendant invites the step (3) subjective inquiry when he undertakes to claim and prove the "extraordinary circumstances"
4
defense.1
Step (1) subjective inquiries raise greater problems. While in
some instances the parties and the courts may draw a clear distinction8 5 between an inquiry necessary to describe conduct and an inquiry seeking impermissibly to examine good faith, in many cases
there will be some overlap. Although the two inquiries may be indistinguishable, at times8 6 some discovery may be unavoidable in
order to determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred.17 Courts, for example, have differed on whether the standards that determine if there is probable cause to conduct a search
or make an arrest are identical to or merely similar to those gov83. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
84. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 ("[Iff the official . . . claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known. . ., the defense should
be sustained.") (emphasis added). For fuller text, see supra note 22.
85. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. One court construing eighth
amendment cases permitted inquiry into evidence tending to prove deliberate or reckless
indifference even though "the same evidence . . . would have been used to defeat a good
faith defense under the subjective criteria." William v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1386 (11th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 335 (1984); cf. Miller v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1020, 1025-26
(8th Cir.) (standards different but inquiry into recklessness of conduct entertained), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 145 (1984).
87. See Kenyatta v. Moore, 744 F.2d 1179, 1185 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Because the
[Harlow] Court did not. . . purge substantive constitutional doctrine of all subjective issues, it did not entirely eliminate subjective inquiry from every qualified immunity analysis:
some rights. . .might be violated by actions undertaken for an impermissible purpose but
not by the same actions undertaken for permissible purposes.") (footnote omitted), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2141 (1985). The Fifth Circuit cited the necessity of proving intentional
racial discrimination as an example. Id. at 1185 n.27; see supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. An area of potentially great difficulty might be the existence of subjective factors
bearings on probable cause in false-arrest or search-and-seizure cases.

1562

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1543

erning post-Harlow objective good faith."8 In each instance, however, there is usually subjective inquiry into the police officer's actual knowledge of certain facts.
Consider three proposed approaches to the problem of subjective discovery in step (1) inquiries. The first approach would continue to bar state-of-mind discovery but would follow the usual
rule 56 approach of reading the record in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party."9 This approach would reduce initial discovery. As plaintiffs' pleading practices changed to
follow the developing case law,9 0 however, exaggeration of defendants' conduct might become so commonplace that it would frustrate the Harlow intent. A second approach, which the D.C. Circuit
proposed in Hobson v. Wilson,91 would require plaintiffs who allege
that an official has acted with an unconstitutional motive to provide in the complaint some "nonconclusory" evidence of the alleged improper motivation in order to proceed to discovery. The
Hobson court's approach would respond to Harlow's concern that
"bare allegations of malice should not suffice" to expose officials to
the burdens of trial or discovery.9 2
88. Compare Wyler v. United States, 725 F.2d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 1983) (standards for
determining these different issues not the same) and Trejo v. Perez, 693 F.2d 482, 487 (5th
Cir. 1982) (lack of immunity and illegality of arrest are not necessarily congruent) with
Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[A]lthough
[the standards for a constitutional violation and those for denying qualified immunity] may
be analytically different .... both depend upon the jury's answer to the question: was probable cause present?") and Losch v. Borough of Parkesburgh, 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir.
1984). But see Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715, 718 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct.
2654 (1985) (holding that the standards for probable cause and qualified immunity in fourth
amendment cases are the same objective criteria stemming from Harlow). Briggs cited a
"suggestion" in United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3421 & n.23 (1984). See also Floyd v.
Farrell, 765 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985) (similar reasoning); cf. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317,
2347 (1983) (White, J., concurring) (similar suggestion in predecessor case to Leon).
89. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
90. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1843
(1985).
91. 737 F.2d at 29-31. The court said:
[A]llegations of unconstitutional motive . . . offer[ ] to litigants a possible means to
circumvent the new rule, simply by pleading that any act was performed with an intent
to violate clearly established constitutional rights and thereby surmounting the threshold test set out in Harlow ....

[P]laintiffs might ...

as a consequence usher defen-

dants into discovery, and perhaps trial, with no hope of success on the merits. The
result would be precisely the burden Harlow sought to prevent.
Id. at 29. See also supra note 67 and accompanying text, for use of the "objective record" by
the court in Smith v. Nixon, 582 F. Supp. 709, 714-15 (D.D.C. 1984).
92. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18. The Hobson proposal is a specific application of a
general approach, initiated in the Third Circuit but generally prevalent in the federal
courts, which requires that plaintiffs plead civil rights complaints "with particularity." 737
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A third approach could provide a desirable compromise. This
approach would adhere more closely to the structure of rule 56"8
and would fulfill better the twin Harlow policies of minimizing
government disruption and providing a "realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees."9' 4 Once an official had moved
for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, any discovery by plaintiffs into defendants' state of mind, even if for the limited purpose of defining his step (1) conduct, could proceed only if
the court approved the discovery under rule 56(f).95 Discovery
could still take place in cases that the court prescreens,9 6 therefore
lessening the likelihood of insubstantial claims. The court also
could shape the scope of discovery to allow only that discovery
necessary to fulfill the required definition of conduct.97 A liberalized use of rule 56(f) would ensure that plaintiffs would not lose
valid constitutional claims for want of critical discovery evidence.
This approach also would avoid the dangers that the Harlow Court
identified as "peculiarly disruptive of effective government":
"broadranging" discovery, the "deposing of numerous persons,"
and the spectre of judicial inquiries "in which there often is no
clear end to the relevant evidence. ' 98
F.2d at 30 & n.87. For a criticism of this requirement, see Jennings, The Relationship of
Procedure to Substance in Civil Rights Actions Under Section 1983: No Cause for Complaint?, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 14-18 (1981).
93. This suggested approach finds support in the language of rule 56 requiring a nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" to
avoid adverse judgment and allowing the court to deny summary judgment and to permit
"depositions. . . or discovery. . . or [to] make such other order as is just" if it appears the
nonmoving party cannot otherwise present "facts essential to justify his opposition." FED. R.
Civ. P. 56(e), (f). For a more complete text of rule 56, see supra note 71.
Courts also could combine this approach with the Hobson court's approach requiring
particularity of pleading. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
94. 457 U.S. at 813-14; see supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text (policies of
Harlow).
95. For full text of rule 56(f), see supra note 71.
96. Although in one sense the heightened supervision entailed in this suggestion might
increase the workload of district courts, plaintiffs' attorneys likely would hesitate to make
frivolous discovery requests lest they incur the wrath of the court. Thus, a net increase in
discovery requests may never occur. See FED. R Civ. P. 56(g) (providing sanctions, including
contempt and attorneys' fees, for affidavits presented in "bad faith or solely for the purpose
of delay"); cf. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1302-03 (1978) (overriding goal of discovery must be
just and full disclosure); Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374, 424-31 (1982)
(potential for due process problems in heightened pretrial judicial role).
97. Discovery under rule 56(f) is inherently less extensive in scope than general discovery obtainable under rule 26. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 298 (1968).
98. 457 U.S. at 816-17; see supra text accompanying note 43.
In Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1984), the First Circuit suggested an
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B. Allocation of the Burden of Proof
1. Multiple Burdens and Conflicting Directions
Before Harlow most lower courts had placed on the defendant
officials9" the burden of proving'"0 their right to qualified immunity. 10 1 In Gomez v. Toledo0 2 the Supreme Court had resolved an
approach that would combine the second and third proposals disjunctively. Although the
Krohn proposal closely tracked the structure of rule 56, the court did not mention rule 56(f)
specifically. The First Circuit said:
A plaintiff, before commencing suit, must be prepared with a prima facie case of
defendant's knowledge of impropriety, actual or constructive. In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, or to impose upon the defendant the burdens of pretrial
discovery, a plaintiff must show more than "a mere desire to cross-examine" but must
furnish "(a)ffidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses." Alternatively, but with a much higher burden than is borne by the plaintiff who opposes an
ordinary summary judgment motion, a plaintiff may seek permission for discovery, or
avoid summary judgment, by making a persuasive showing that affirmative evidence
would be available, and giving a valid excuse for non-production. To hold less would
defeat the entire purpose of freeing government officials from having to defend insubstantial suits.
Id. at 31-32.
99. See Gildin, The Standard of Culpabilityin Section 1983 and Bivens Actions: The
Prima Facie Case, Qualified Immunity and the Constitution, 11 HoFSTRA L. REV. 557, 596
n.214 (1983) and cases cited therein. Courts in the Seventh and First Circuits were divided
concerning the allocation of the burden of pleading qualified immunity. Compare Chavis v.
Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1288 (7th Cir.) (burden on defendant), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 907
(1981) and DeVasto v. Faherty, 658 F.2d 859, 865 (1st Cir. 1981) (burden on defendant)
with Whitley v. Seibel, 613 F.2d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 1980) (burden on plaintiff) and Soto v.
Chardon, 514 F. Supp. 339, 345-50 (D.P.R. 1981) (burden on plaintiff), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 989 (1982). The Fifth Circuit placed the burden on defendant when he had little discretionary authority and on plaintiff when the defendant was a high-ranking official with
considerable discretion. See Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 534 (5th Cir. 1980); see also
Note, Qualified Immunity for Public Officials Under Section 1983 in the Fifth Circuit, 60
TEx. L. REV. 127, 131-37 (1981).
100. Unless otherwise stated, this Note uses "burden of proof" to indicate the burden
of persuasion, not the burden of production. Courts and commentators sometimes refer to
the burden of persuasion as the "risk of nonpersuasion." See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra
note 15, §§ 7.6-.7 (2d ed. 1977).
101. For a discussion of the importance of the burden of proof, see generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) ("[T]he principal significance of the burden
of persuasion is limited to those cases in which the trier of fact is actually in doubt."). For a
discussion of the relative importance of the placement of the burden of proof concerning
qualified immunity in § 1983 cases, see S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CxVIL LIBERTIES LITiGATION § 8.13 (1979). See also Kattan, Knocking on Wood: Some Thoughts on the Immunities of State Officials to Civil Rights Damage Actions, 30 VAND. L. REV. 941, 975 (1977);
McClellan & Norcross, Remedies and Damages for Violation of Constitutional Rights, 18
DUQ. L. REV. 409, 446-48 (1980). But see Casto, supra note 49, at 52 n.27 ("The extent to
which burden of persuasion on this issue has an actual impact upon litigation is
problematical.").
102. 446 U.S. 635, 638 nn.4-5 (1980). The First Circuit differed from all other circuits
in requiring plaintiff to plead the defendant's lack of good faith.
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intercircuit split on whether defendants or plaintiffs possessed the
burden of pleading qualified immunity by placing that burden
upon defendants. The Gomez decision, however, did not address
explicitly the question of the burden of persuasion.
In Harlow the Court specifically reserved 0 3 discussion concerning the allocation of the burden of persuasion. Several elements of the opinion, however, did bear at least indirectly on the
question. First, the Court noted that in Gomez it previously had
characterized qualified immunity as an affirmative defense that the
defendant official must plead.0 4 In addition, the Court noted that
Gomez had not decided which party bore the burden of proof. 10 5
Second, the Court, in an early part of the opinion, 0 6 discussed defendants' claims to be absolutely immune under a derivative form
of presidential immunity and allocated to the officials the burden
of proof on that issue. By analogy defendants would bear the burden of proving their "entitlement"' 0 7 to qualified immunity-that
they were acting within the scope of their duties. Third, in describing the third step of the new three-step objective inquiry, 0 8 the
Court said it would sustain the defense if the official "claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor
should have known of the relevant legal standard."' 0 9 The Court's
language strongly implied"10 that the defendant carries the burden
of persuasion on an "extraordinary circumstances" claim. Last, by
eliminating the subjective prong"' of the test for qualified immu103. 457 U.S. at 815 n.24.
104. Id. at 815.
105. Id. at 815 n.24.
106. Id. at 812-13 ("[Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978)] also identifies the
location of the burden of proof. [It] rests on the official asserting the claim. . . . He then
must demonstrate that he was discharging the protected function when performing the act
for which liability is asserted.") (footnotes and citation omitted).
107. Proving entitlement means to establish that the official was within the scope of
his duties. An official remains entitled to qualified immunity only if he acts with the requisite good faith, regardless of how that "good faith" is defined. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 557 (1967); Sadana v. Garza, 684 F.2d 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1012 (1983).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
109. 457 U.S. at 819 (emphasis added). For fuller text, see supra note 22.
110. The Court's language, however, was less than explicit. In the late 1970's, some
courts and commentators believed that the Court, in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975), impliedly had placed the qualified immunity burden on defendants, while others
thought the Court's opinion in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), impliedly placed
the burden on plaintiffs. See Kattan, supra note 101, at 988; Sowle, Qualified Immunity in
Section 1983 Cases: The Unresolved Issues of the Conditionsfor Its Use and the Burden of
Persuasion,55 TUL. L. Rav. 326, 393-95 (1981) and cases cited therein.
111. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
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nity, the Court altered one of the factors 1 2 that courts traditionally rely on in allocating the burden of proof.
Lower courts have not read Harlow uniformly on the burden
of proof issue. The courts that have addressed the issue agree that
the burden of persuasion will fall upon the defendant who claims
that because of extraordinary circumstances he neither knew nor
should have known he was violating established constitutional
rights."13 This approach accords with the way most courts addressed the issue of subjective good faith in the pre-Harlow period." 4 The courts, however, are divided on whether plaintiff or
defendant should bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of
whether the applicable law was clearly established at the time of
15
the incident."
112. See infra notes 121-22, 136-39, 144-45 and accompanying text (discussing the
"fairness" rationale for burden allocation).
113. See, e.g., Arebaugh v. Dalton, 730 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir. 1984); Joseph A. v. New
Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 575 F. Supp. 346, 354 (D.N.M. 1983); Heslip v. Lobbs, 554
F. Supp. 694, 701 n.5 (E.D. Ark. 1982). But see Singer v. Wadman, 595 F. Supp. 181, 277 (D.
Utah 1982) ("A plaintiff must further demonstrate an issue of fact as to whether the defendant, based on objective factors, actually knew or should have known that his conduct
would violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights."). The Singer court did not make clear
whether it was speaking of a burden of persuasion or only of the plaintiff's obligation under
FED. R. Cirv. P. 56(e) to respond to the movant's evidence. For a discussion of the evolving
relationship between these two features of summary judgment, see generally Louis, supra
note 72.
114. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
115. See supra text accompanying note 22. Courts in the D.C., Sixth, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits have placed this burden on defendant. See Tuttle v. City of Oklahoma City,
728 F.2d 456, 458 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985); Buller v.
Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 850 (8th Cir. 1983); Alexander v. Alexander, 706 F.2d 751, 753-54
(6th Cir. 1983); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 66-69 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1316 (1984). District courts in the Second and Seventh Circuits also have placed the
burden on defendant. See Boussom v. City of Elkhart, 567 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (N.D. Ind.
1983); Visser v. Magnarelli, 542 F. Supp. 1331, 1337 n.11 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
Placing the burden on defendant is in accord with the common law notion that a warrantless arrest or seizure is prima facie illegal unless the defendant official establishes an
exception to this rule by showing there was probable cause. See Saldana v. Garza, 684 F.2d
1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d
167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978). Whether this tradition should create
a subset of cases within the general category of executive officials for purposes of allocating
the burden of proof is problematical. Arrest and search cases comprise a substantial percentage of nonprisoner § 1983 cases. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 536 & n.243. Adherence
to the common law approach probably underlay the Fifth Circuit's pre-Harlowapproach of
keeping the burden on defendant when he was a low-ranking police officer but shifting the
burden to plaintiff when defendant was an official of higher rank and discretion. See Sowle,
supra note 110, at 398-416, and supra note 99, for the former Fifth Circuit rule. The common law allocation in these cases also follows the probability rationale of burden allocation
by placing the burden on the party seeking to prove the exception to the rule. See infra note
120 and accompanying text.
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Rationales for Burden Allocation

Allocation of the burden of persuasion" 6 is a judicial responsibility 17 that includes both theoretical and practical considerations.1 1 8 Three major rationales underlie the modern"19 approach to
burden allocation: probability, fairness, and policy. According to
the probability rationale, the party who would benefit by departure from a supposed norm bears the burden of persuasion. To illustrate: most plaintiffs suing for nonpayment of a bill have, in
fact, not been paid; therefore, payment of the bill should be an
affirmative defense with the burden of persuasion upon the defendant. 120 Under the fairness rationale the party with "readier access
to knowledge about the fact in question" bears the burden of persuasion.' 21 Continuing the bill-payment example, the party who
paid the bill is more likely to have access to evidence that will
prove that fact; 22 therefore, this party must sustain the burden of
persuasion. Courts that adhere to the policy rationale for burden
Courts in the Fifth and Third Circuits either have placed the burden on the plaintiffs
or at least have removed the burden from the defendants. See Sampson v. King, 693 F.2d
566, 569 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Berg & Dryden, The Modification of the Qualified Immunity Test: An Analysis of Harlow v. Fitzgerald's Effect on Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
33 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 353, 360 (1983) (concluding that Harlow shifts burden to plaintiff).
The Third Circuit has said that the defendant "has the burden of pleading and proving
qualified immunity, [but] the objective standard as announced in Harlow allows a court to
cut short the inquiry into a defendant's state of mind and to grant summary judgment in
'insubstantial' claims." Losch v. Borough of Parkesburgh, 736 F.2d 903, 909 (3d Cir. 1984)
(footnotes omitted). Perhaps if a court perceived the issue as one purely of law the court
might resolve the issue without argument from either party; then neither party would seem
to have a burden to carry. This perception, however, would confuse the burden of production with the burden of persuasion. If a possibility remains for the decisionmaker to be in
doubt, someone must bear the risk of nonpersuasion. See supra notes 100-01. In addition,
determination of the applicable legal standard inevitably involves some inquiry into the factual setting. See supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text; see also Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) ("Nor do we yet know of any rule or principle that will
unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion.").
116. See supra notes 100-01 (definition and importance of the burden of persuasion).
117. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 101, § 336.
118. Id. § 337, at 949 (stating that rules assigning burdens owe their development
"partly to traditional happen-so and partly to considerations of policy").
119. The seminal modem authority for allocation of the burden of persuasion is
Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5
(1959). See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, § 7.8; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 101, § 337; Bridge, Burdens Within Burdens at a Trial Within a Trial, 23 B.C.L. REV.
927, 929-34 (1982) (all relying on Cleary for their analyses).
120. See Cleary, supra note 119, at 12-14. One commentator criticised this rationale
for using the probabilities twice against a burdened party. See Ball, The Moment of Truth:
ProbabilityTheory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L. REV. 807, 817-18 (1961).
121. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, § 7.8, at 252.
122. See Bridge, supra note 119, at 933.
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allocation use the burden of persuasion as a frank "handicap" to
discourage the making of a "disfavored contention."'' 3 In the billpayment example, a judiciary that approved of bill payment, and
was suspicious of spurious claims of payment, would place the burden upon defendant. Finally, courts also consider in allocating the
burden of persuasion: (1) the character-affirmative or negative-of the proposition, 124 (2) determination of the party to whom
a proposition is essential, 1 25 and (3) the general rule that the burden of persuasion should follow the burden of pleading a given issue.1 2 6 Influential commentators, however, have rejected these con127
siderations as having little importance.
3.

The "Clearly Established" Test: A Plaintiff's Burden?

After Harlow three distinct issues exist in qualified immunity
12
cases; a court may allocate a burden of proof for each issue. Of
the three issues, Harlow appears to direct the defendant to carry
123. See F. JAMES & G.HAZARD, supra note 15, § 7.8, at 252.
124. "This is no more than a play on words, since practically any proposition may be
stated in either affirmative or negative form." Cleary, supra note 119, at 11. In qualified
immunity cases, for example, one could state either that the law was clearly established or
that the official was in doubt. Both statements are affirmative propositions.
125. "This does no more than restate the question." Id.
126. The same general considerations of policy, fairness, and convenience affect the
allocation of both burdens, so that they often, but not inevitably, parallel each other. See
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, § 7.8. Generally, the moving party has the burden of
persuasion. Shifting the burden of persuasion to the nonmovant, however, violates no firm
principle. "The issue, rather, 'is merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience
in the different situations.'" Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973) (quoting
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940)).
127. See authorities cited supra note 119. The majority opinion in Gomez v. Toledo,
446 U.S. 635 (1980), which allocated the burden of pleading qualified immunity to defendants, rested partly on a statutory analysis of § 1983. The Court held that the statute, by its
terms, requires that a plaintiff allege only two things to state a claim for relief: (1) deprivation of a federal right and (2) action under color of state or territorial law. A defendant,
therefore, claiming qualified immunity seeks an exception to the statute and, under pleading
principles, raises a "matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." 446 U.S. at
640 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c)).
While the factors relied upon in Gomez have obvious relevance in allocating the burden
of pleading, they do not necessarily extend to the burden of persuasion. See Cleary, supra
note 119, at 8-9. For the common law approach to rules and their exceptions in allocating
the burden of persuasion, see also supra note 116.
The Gomez Court's other rationale rested on the subjective prong of the pre-Harlow
test for qualified immunity, stressing plaintiff's lack of access to an official's beliefs. The
change in Harlow to an objective standard, coupled with the ready disjunction of the burdens of pleading and persuasion, limits the influence of the reasoning in Gomez upon postHarlow allocation of the burden of persuasion. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815 n.24 (reserving
the burden of proof despite Gomez).
128. See supra notes 26, 106-15 and accompanying text.
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the burden of proving: (1) that he was acting within the scope of
his office, 129 and (2) if appropriate, that "extraordinary circumstances" existed so that the official neither knew nor should have
known of the relevant law. 30 Harlow did not allocate explicitly the
remaining burden of proving the other or "threshold" issue-whether the applicable law was clearly established at the
time of the incident.1 1
The major rationales of burden allocation' 32 and the major
policies 3 3 underlying Harlow generally support placing the burden
of proof on this unresolved issue upon the plaintiff.13 4 First, the
probability rationale, the weakest of the three, would presume that
public officials know their constitutional duties and are responsible
for constitutional violations occurring as a result of their actions.
Once a public official has shown that he was acting within the
scope of his duties, the public official also should bear the onus of
proving the exception to the rule. 3 5 Second, the fairness rationale
supports placing the burden on the plaintiffs. Because Harlow generally has stripped away subjective considerations from the Wood
v. Strickland test for qualified immunity, 3 6 any special access a
defendant official might have to subjective evidence concerning his
state of mind ought to have less relevance. 3 7 To the extent that
Harlow has reduced the importance of these subjective factors,
under the fairness rationale,'138 courts are less unfair' 39 when re129. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
130. This burden could arise only if the court has held that a violation of "clearly
established" rights did occur. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
131. This issue, of course, contains two elements corresponding to the first two steps
of the Harlow three-step inquiry- determining the law applicable to the relevant facts and
determining whether that law was clearly established at the time of the incident. See supra
notes 26, 44 and accompanying text. The Harlow Court spoke of these two related inquiries
only as issues "the judge appropriately may determine." 457 U.S. at 818. For fuller text, see
supra note 22.
132. See supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
134. But see infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text (discussing reservation about
this conclusion).
135. "[A] reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819; see also supra note 120 and accompanying text (probability
rationale).
136. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
137. But see supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text (allowing subjective inquiries
into conduct, but not into motivation); infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text (caveat
regarding fairness and adequacy of discovery).
138. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
139. But see infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between fairness and adequacy of discovery).
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quiring the plaintiff to prove the official's "bad faith" in a primarily objective manner.
Last, the policy rationale strongly supports placing the burden
of proof on the plaintiff. The Harlow Court's concern that "insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of government as
contemplated by our constitutional structure, "140 coupled with the
Court's hope that the lower courts could resolve many of these
claims on summary judgment,14 1 places a civil rights plaintiff in the
position of advancing a "disfavored contention.' 1 42 This strong policy rationale favors placing the burden on plaintiff; the policy consideration would outweigh the probability rationale for placing the
burden upon defendant, especially if fairness required no contrary
result. Indeed, the Court implicitly may have allocated the burden
to plaintiff in a subsequent qualified immunity case, Davis v.

Scherer.143

If plaintiffs are to bear the burden of persuasion on the
threshold "clearly established" issue, the relationship between the
adequacy of discovery and the allocation of the burden of persuasion becomes particularly important. To the extent that courts require close factual correspondence between the instant case and
earlier cases arguably establishing the relevant precedent, 4 4 they
should permit plaintiffs a reasonable amount of discovery 45 to establish the requisite factual similarity. Otherwise the fairness rationale would increasingly favor placing the burden of proof upon
the defendants.
C. Appealability of Summary Judgment Denial
1. Summary Judgment Denial as a Nonfinal Decision
The doctrine requiring finality of decision 4 6 before appeal has

140. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819-20 n.35.
141. Id. at 818.
142. See supra text accompanying note 123.
143. 104 S. Ct. 3012, 3021 (1984) ("A plaintiff. . may overcome the defendant official's qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the
time of the conduct at issue.") (emphasis added). But see supra note 110 (discussing
hazards of assuming implied allocation of burden).
144. See supra note 44.
145. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text; see also Sonenshein, supra note
73, at 785-86 (emphasizing need to relate required standard of proof to party's access to

facts).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). The statute provides: "The courts of appeal . . . shall
have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States... except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. .. " Id. (emphasis added).
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been "the dominant rule in federal appellate practice. ' 147 The fundamental policy underlying this rule is the avoidance of piecemeal
litigation 148 and its resultant inequities 49 and inefficiencies. 50 As a
general rule, 5 ' denial5 2 of a motion for summary judgment is not
a final decision for purposes of appeal; therefore, the denied party
has no right 153 of immediate appeal. In the usual case,25 4 denial of
147. 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 75, 110.06 (2d ed. 1985). The finality
principle has its roots in common law. See Metcalfe's Case, 11 Coke 38, 40 (1614). The First
Judiciary Act incorporated this principle. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84.
See generally Note, The FinalityRule for Supreme Court Review of State Court Orders, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1005-12 (1978); Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L.
REV. 351 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Note, Appealability].
148. In Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940), the Supreme Court noted:
Congress from the very beginning has, by forbidding piecemeal disposition on appeal of
what for practical purposes is a single controversy, set itself against enfeebling judicial
administration. Thereby is avoided the obstruction to just claims that would come
from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the
various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment. To be effective, judicial administration must not be leaden-footed. Its momentum would be arrested by permitting separate reviews of the component elements in a
unified cause.
Id. at 325.
149. See id.; Note, Appealability, supra note 147, at 351-53.
150. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); 15 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTCE & PROCEDURE § 3907, at 432-33 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE]. In addition to stressing the greater
efficiency that a single unified review provides, the Risjord Court also emphasized the "deference that appellate courts owe to the trial judge." Risjord, 449 U.S. at 374. "Permitting
piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge, as well as the
special role that individual plays in our judicial system." Id.
151. See Pacific Union Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Marshall, 434 U.S.
1305 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1977); 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 75,
56.2112] (2d ed. 1985); Annot., 17 L. Ed. 2d 886 (1966).
152. A party often may appeal the grant of a motion for summary judgment immediately, depending upon the relationship of the decided issue to any remaining issues in a
case. See Ardoin v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 641 F.2d 277, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1981). An
interlocutory adjudication under rule 56 becomes final only if the decisionmaker enters the
judgment under FED R. Ciw. P. 54(b). See 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 75,
56.20(1). Because a court that grants a motion for qualified immunity on summary judgment may enter that judgment under rule 54(b), courts often hear these cases on appeal.
See Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 56 & n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1316 (1984); cf. Thompson v. Betts, 754 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding grant of summary
judgment motion for absolute immunity not immediately appealable because court did not
enter rule 54(b) order).
153. "The traditional view is that the U.S. Constitution does not create a right to
appellate review but instead leaves that matter, like the creation of inferior federal courts
and their jurisdiction, to Congress." Federal Civil Appellate Jurisdiction:An Interlocutory
Restatement, 47 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 13, 19 (Spring 1984) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Appellate Jurisdiction].
154. On rare occasions, courts have made exceptions to this rule in cases concerning
the enforcement of statutes. See 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 75, T 56.21[2].
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the motion merely postpones a decision on the issue until trial;' 5 5
appellate consideration may then be unnecessary should the movant later prevail. In any event, the appellate court's deliberation
on the issue should be wiser when based upon a full record developed during trial. 5 6
Because summary judgment denial is not a final decision, defendants seeking immediate appeal must do so under one of two
major applicable exceptions. 157 They may request the district court
judge to certify the decision as an appealable interlocutory order,15 s or they may seek to qualify for appeal under the judicial
exception to the final decision rule known as the collateral order
59
doctrine.1
2.

Limited Guidance and Conflicting Policies

Before Harlow, the fact-intensive nature of the "objective-subjective" test under Wood v. Strickland'6" had made the considerations governing appealability of summary judgment denial in gen162
eral 161 equally applicable to denial of qualified immunity.
155. "[D]enial of a motion for a summary judgment because of unresolved issues of
fact ... is strictly a pretrial order that decides only one thing-that the case should go to
trial." Switzerland Cheese Ass'n, Inc. v. E. Horne's Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966)
(construing 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) in a case appealing denial of summary judgment of motion seeking a permanent injunction); see also Appellate Jurisdiction,supra note 153, at
190.
156. See 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 150, § 3907, at 432-33; Note,
Appealability, supra note 147, at 351-52.
157. In addition to trying the two major routes of appeal discussed infra in notes 175250 and accompanying text, a litigant also could attempt to invoke the extraordinary aid of
a reviewing court by seeking supervisory mandamus under the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651 (1982). See Richardson Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2757, 2763 (1985). The writ,
however, is reserved for clear abuses of judicial discretion or usurpations of judicial power;
the party is not to use the writ as a substitute for appeal. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379
U.S. 104 (1964). Use of the writ, therefore, would seem inappropriate for an adverse decision
on an issue of recurring importance.
158. Certification is available under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982). See infra notes 237-50
and accompanying text.
159. Arising from a "practical rather than technical construction" of 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
the collateral order doctrine excepts from the final decision rule a "small class [of decisions]
which finally determine [sic] claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted
in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). The test underwent some revision
in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). See infra notes 177-79 and
accompanying text (description of Livesay restatement).
160. 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975); see supra notes 11 & 23.
161. See supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.
162. See Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1209 (3d Cir. 1979) (refusing to allow
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Harlow itself dealt only peripherally with appealability. The case
actually came to the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari appealing
a summary judgment denial on grounds of absolute immunity. 6 "
The Court asserted its jurisdiction TM over the case without lengthy
discussion, noting that the Court already had held summary judgment denial of absolute presidential immunity immediately appealable in Harlow's companion case, Nixon v. Fitzgerald.165 After
redefining qualified immunity and holding that the Harlow defendants were entitled to have their claims to qualified immunity adjudicated under the new test, the Court vacated the judgment and
remanded the case to the district court for application of the objective standard. 66
Harlow's conversion of qualified immunity to an objective
standard16 7 reopened the issue of the appealability of a summary
judgment denial. The circuits that confronted this problem after
Harlow were divided on the question. Three circuits held that defendants could appeal immediately under the collateral order exception, 6 8 and four circuits held that defendants could not appeal
immediately.16 9 Each circuit recognized that the policies underly7
ing Harlow7 0 and the policies generally governing appealability' '
should play a critical role in the determination of this issue. The
courts, however, focused on different features of the Harlow policies and hence arrived at divergent outcomes for different reasons.
Courts permitting appeals pointed to Harlow's concern that offiappeal of qualified immunity claim denied on summary judgment and noting that defendants did "not seriously contend" that the denial was appealable), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913

(1981).

163. 457 U.S. at 805-06.
164. Id. at 806 n.11.
165. 457 U.S. 731, 741-43. Fitzgerald had alleged in a Bivens suit that President Nixon
and two of his top aides, the Harlow defendants, had conspired to fire him from a management analyst job in the Department of Defense in retaliation for his testimony about cost
overruns to a congressional committee. See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 733-40; Harlow, 457 U.S. at
802-05.
166. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 811-13.
167. Id. at 818-19; see supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
168. See Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1984); Evans v. Dillahunty, 711
F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1983); McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
169. See Powers v. Lightner, 752 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1985); Kenyatta v. Moore, 744
F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2141 (1985); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 729
F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985); Bever v.
Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 349 (1984).
170. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
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cials be free from the risks of unnecessary trial or discovery.1 72
Courts rejecting appealability, on the other hand, noted that the
focus of the Harlow opinion was on the termination of insubstantial claims,17 3 not the termination of all civil rights suits against
government officials. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Mitchell v. Forsyth7 4 to resolve this intercircuit split.
3.

Denial of Qualified Immunity

(a) Appeal as a Collateral Order Exception
17 5
Despite the fundamental nature of the final decision rule, it
1 76
has both statutory
and judicial exceptions. The judicial exception, the collateral order doctrine, is a narrow exception that has
its roots in two different lines of cases that converged 77 in the
1978 Supreme Court decision of Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay. 7
The Livesay doctrine restricts the exception to a "small class" of
orders that "conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve
an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
79
judgment.'

172. See, e.g., Krohn, 742 F.2d at 28 (stating that courts can effect Harlow's interest in
avoiding trial in cases with insubstantial claims only by permitting immediate appeal); McSurely, 697 F.2d at 316 (emphasizing that interlocutory review must be available "to ensure
that government officials are fully protected against unnecessary trials").
173. See, e.g., Kenyatta, 744 F.2d at 1184 (noting that courts trangress Harlow's interests only if claim is insubstantial); see also Forsyth, 729 F.2d at 273-74.
174. 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985), aff'g in part and rev'g in part Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 729
F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984). The Court granted -ertiorari on the same issue in a second case
from the Eleventh Circuit but later remanded the case for further consideration in light of
the the Supreme Court's opinion in Mitchell. See Jasinski v. Adams, 745 F.2d 70 (11th Cir.
1984) (mem.) (dismissing an appeal from the Southern District of Florida), vacated and
remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3518 (1985). Like Mitchell, Jasinski was a Bivens action.
175.

See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.

176. The principal statutory exception is 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a) (Supp. 1985), which
provides interlocutory appeal for certain orders granting or refusing injunctive relief.
177. The lines of cases derive from Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949), see supra note 159, and Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848). Forgay
concerned the immediate transfer of property at issue in the case; the Court appears to have
combined its notion of avoiding irreparable harm with the criteria enumerated in Cohen in
its restated formulation of the collateral order doctrine in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463 (1978). See infra text accompanying notes 178-79.
178.

437 U.S. 463 (1978).

179.

Id. at 468.
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(1) The Collateral Order Doctrine Before Mitchell
During the three-year period following Harlow, the circuits
had applied these four Livesay criteria to test whether denial of
qualified immunity merited immediate appeal under the collateral
order doctrine. First, the courts' decisions indicate that whether
summary judgment conclusively determined the issue depended on
whether unresolved issues of material fact existed'"0 whose resolution courts merely were postponing to trial. If the case presented
no disputed issues of fact"8 and the court was ruling primarily on
a question of law, 8

2

then qualified immunity denial could satisfy

the first criterion. Second, although the issues involved in resolving
qualified immunity claims might have been conceptually separate
from the merits of the main case, in the courts' analyses, often
these issues appeared closely linked. 8 3
Third, no court disputed the importance of the issue of qualified immunity as a general proposition, but some courts wondered
whether the issue was important enough in every case to justify a
potentially burdensome increase in the appellate caseload immediate appeals would trigger.8 4 In Kenyatta v. Moore, for example,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit distinguished between the legal importance of the issue of appealability
of qualified immunity denial and the legal importance of qualified
immunity denial as a recurring issue. The court said: "If.

.

. we

hold denials of summary judgment appealable per se, the right to
appeal will be assured in a large number of cases that present no
significant legal issues, for . . . [many qualified immunity cases]

involve only the application of settled principles, not important,
180. See Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 187 n.1 (4th Cir. 1984) (refusing to allow
appeal of qualified immunity denial when trial court had concluded that evidence concerning defendants' activities was insufficient and had permitted plaintiffs to continue discovery), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1754; Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828, 830 (8th Cir. 1983)
(indicating that courts should allow appeal only if "essential facts are not in dispute" and
determination of immunity is "solely a question of law").
181. In Evans the court said this criterion would be satisfied if the trial court made
"specific findings of fact, or if the parties stipulate[d] to the relevant facts." 711 F.2d at 830;
see Schwarzer, supra note 72, at 469-81, 489-93.
182. But see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text, for difficulties in characterizing the objective test as one purely of law.
183. Especially in the absence of discovery, this might be difficult for a reviewing court
to predict. See Kenyatta, 744 F.2d at 1185 (noting that inseparable intertwining of plaintiff's claims and qualified immunity defenses is "typical"); Williams v. Collins, 728 F.2d 721,
726 n.6 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that "qualified immunity issues are more closely entwined
with the merits of a case than are issues of absolute immunity").
184. See Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 729 F.2d at 274.
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unresolved legal issues.' ' 8 5
Last, denial of qualified immunity had to be "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment"'18 in order to satisfy the
fourth Livesay criterion. In the analogous area of absolute immunity, the Supreme Court had held on three occasions that orders
denying absolute immunity were appealable immediately.1 87 Those
cases turned upon whether the rights asserted would be lost irrevocably if the denials were not appealable.
In Abney v. United States'8 and Helstoski v. Meanor8 9 the
Supreme Court recognized that absolute freedom from trial on
grounds of double jeopardy or legislative immunity would be lost
irrevocably' 9 0 if courts did not permit immediate appeal of pretrial
denial of those claims. Later decisions that focused on other defendants' claims to be free from trial, however, construed this freedom
narrowly.' 9' Nonetheless, because these cases involved criminal appeals their precedential value for the qualified immunity issue is
probably limited. The Supreme Court has said repeatedly that the
final decision rule is "at its strongest in the field of criminal
185. Kenyatta, 744 F.2d at 1186; cf. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 547. The Cohen Court said:
But we do not mean that every order fixing security is subject to appeal. Here it is the
right to security that presents a serious and unsettled question. If the right were admitted or clear and the order involved only an exercise of discretion as to the amount of
security, . . . appealability would present a different question.
Id. The importance of the issue has been an unpredictable element of the criteria for collateral orders to which the Supreme Court has accorded varying attention over the years. The
Court in Cohen emphasized the "serious and unsettled question" requirement. The Court
then did not remark on the issue in Livesay and in Risjord, but the Court reemphasized the
requirement in Nixon, 457 U.S. at 742-43. But see Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Co., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (describing the Livesay doctrine as having three criteria and not
testing for importance).
186. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 468. For fuller quotation, see supra text accompanying note
179.
187. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500
(1979) (speech and debate clause immunity); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977)
(double jeopardy clause immunity).
188. 431 U.S. 651, 656-62 (1977).
189. 442 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1979).
190. See Abney, 431 U.S. at 662. The Court said: "[These aspects of the guarantee's
protection would be lost if the accused were forced to 'run the gauntlet' a second time
before an appeal could be taken ...
191. See United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263 (1982) (per curiam)
(vindictive prosecution claim for immunity); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 851
(1978) (speedy trial clause claim). In Hollywood Motor Car the Court said the defendant's
asserted right to be free from vindictive prosecution was "simply not one that must be upheld prior to trial if it is to be enjoyed at all." 458 U.S. at 270. The Court distinguished
between "a right not to be tried and a right whose remedy requires the dismissal of the
charges." 458 U.S. at 269.
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law."1 92 The Court generally has applied a "practical""1 ' approach
to the final decision rule. Even in criminal cases the Court has recognized that protection should be given to "an asserted right the
legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were
not vindicated before trial." 194
In Powers v. Lightner the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit said that qualified immunity, unlike absolute
immunity, does not entail "a right to be free from trial." The court
rejected defendants' argument that denials of qualified and absolute immunity should be treated as equally appealable "simply because both forms of immunity respond to the dangers of exposing
government officials to the risks of trial."' 9 In Krohn v. United
States, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that, despite the differences between absolute and
qualified immunity, an official whom a court denied appeal in a
qualified immunity case would have the benefits of Harlow "cancelled out."' 9
Ultimately, Harlow-based decisions whether to permit appeal
from denial of qualified immunity appeared to turn on how much
protection a court deemed necessary to safeguard officials against
insubstantial claims. 197 In Kenyatta v. Moore' 98 the Fifth Circuit
had said that a district court's holding that a plaintiff's rights were
192. Flanagan v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1051, 1054 (1984) (quoting Hollywood Motor Car, 458 U.S. at 265); see Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).
193. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 ("The Court has long given [§ 1291] this practical
rather than a technical construction.") (emphasis added), quoted with approval in Gillespie
v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964).
194. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978) (emphasis added), cited
with approval in Hollywood Motor Car, 458 U.S. at 267-69.
195. Powers, 752 F.2d at 1256. Judge Wisdom elaborated on the distinction:
[T]he rights encompassed by the doctrines of qualified and absolute immunity are not
coextensive. The "purpose behind absolute immunity is as much to protect the relevant
persons from a trial on their actions as it is to protect them from the outcome of trial."
Those who enjoy absolute immunity are therefore entitled to defeat the suit at the
outset. By contrast, whether qualified immunity protects against trial depends upon
the circumstances of the official's actions.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted) (quoting Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 59 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978)).
196. Krohn, 742 F.2d at 28 (quoting Abney, 431 U.S. at 662 n.7). An important procedural distinction between the two forms of immunity had been that absolute immunity
could defeat a claim on a motion to dismiss. Parties, however, must have pleaded and supported qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, even though Harlow's objective standard appeared to have foreshortened this process. See infra notes 220-31 and accompanying
text.
197. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text (policies of Harlow).
198. 744 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2141 (1985).
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clearly established under the relevant legal standard at the time of
the conduct in question should be sufficient protection itself
against insubstantial claims. 199 Although the validity of the Kenyatta approach depends on a certain level of confidence in the sagacity of the trial court, respect for the decisionmaking capacity of
the trial court is one of the three major policies underlying the final decision rule. 0 0 As the Kenyatta court emphasized: "Judges
are not infallible, and errors may be anticipated in application of
the Harlow standard like any other. Nevertheless, few if any district judges are likely to mistake insubstantial claims for violations
of clearly established rights .... ,2"0
(2) Mitchell v. Forsyth
In Mitchell v. Forsyth2 0 2 the Supreme Court resolved the intercircuit division, decreeing that immediate appeal is necessary to
199. Id. at 1184 ("The trial itself transgresses the interests protected by qualified immunity only if the claim is insubstantial, and the defendant-official has nothing to appeal if
he has failed to persuade a district judge that his defense is well-founded.").
200. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
201. 744 F.2d at 1184. But see Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1984),
for the opposing approach to the insubstantiality issue. The First Circuit held that qualified
immunity should be appealable routinely to effectuate Harlow's policy against insubstantial
lawsuits, provided the claim to immunity was "plausible."
202. 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985). The case stemmed from a warrantless wiretapping in
1970-1971 that John Mitchell, then attorney general of the Untied States, authorized to
investigate a group called the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives. The group allegedly
plotted to blow up tunnels underneath federal buildings in Washington, D.C. and to kidnap
National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. The qualified immunity issue was whether the
law was clearly established at the time that there was no authority for warrantless national
security wiretaps. Accepting the plaintiff's suspicions that Mitchell's true motives were political, wiretapping for those purposes clearly was outlawed at the time. Accepting the former attorney general's statement in deposition that he was motivated by national security
concerns, the law barring this type of wiretapping did not become clearly established until a
year after Mitchell's actions, when the Supreme Court decided United States v. United
States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297 (1972). See 105 S. Ct. at 2818-20.
The case had a long and convoluted procedural history. See Mitchell, 105 S. Ct. at
2809-12. Discovery lasted five-and-a-half years, and the District Court had ruled against the
defendant's claims for absolute and for qualified immunity both before and after Harlow.
Id. at 2810-11. On the post-Harlow appeal, the Third Circuit had accepted appellate jurisdiction on the absolute immunity issue and ruled against Mitchell on the merits. The court,
however, had held the qualified immunity denial unappealable for lack of jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 729 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on three issues: (1) whether the attorney general
had absolute immunity for national security wiretapping; (2) if not, whether qualified immunity denial was appealable immediately; and (3) if so, whether the attorney general was
entitled to qualified immunity. The Court held that (1) Mitchell was not absolutely immune; (2) the District Court's denial of qualified immunity was immediately appealable; and
(3) Mitchell was entitled to qualified immunity from damages.
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protect officials from the danger of insubstantial claims and that
appeal of qualified immunity denial thus is appeal of a collateral
order. The Court squarely rejected both the Kenyatta dictum, that
the considered opinion of one judge on the "clearly established"
question is safeguard enough against insubstantial claims, and the
Powers distinction between the degrees of immunity from trial
that qualified and absolute immunity afford. The Court held that
summary judgment denial of qualified immunity met the requirements of the collateral order doctrine. The Court noted that qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively
lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. 2 0 3 Qualified
immunity, thus, is "in fact an entitlement not to stand trial under
certain circumstances,'2 0 4 and, therefore, a decision by a district
court to deny qualified immunity is "effectively unreviewable on
'205
appeal from a [later] final judgment.
Only seven Justices participated. Justice Powell, who wrote for the Harlow majority,
was ill. Justice Rehnquist, who had been a Justice Department policymaker at the time of
the wiretapping, apparently recused himself. Four Justices agreed that there was no absolute immunity (Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor and Stevens dissenting); four
Justices agreed that the qualified immunity issue was appealable (Justices Brennan and
Marshall dissenting, with Justice Stevens not reaching the issue); and four Justices agreed
that there was qualified immunity (Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens not reaching
the issue, but Justice Brennan's separate opinion not accepting the Court's characterization
of the attorney general's motivations). Justice White wrote for the Court.
Although only four members of the Court embraced the holding on appealability, it
seems likely that Justice Powell, the Harlow author, and probably Justice Rehnquist would
agree. But cf. Pacific Union Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Marshall, 434 U.S.
1305 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1977) (holding that denials of summary judgment generally
are unappealable).
203. 105 S. Ct. at 2816 (emphasis in original).
204. Id. at 2815. The Court also described qualified immunity as "an entitlement not
to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigations, conditioned on the resolution of the
essentially legal question whether the conduct of which the plaintiff complains violated
clearly established law." Id. at 2816.
205. Id. In his dissent, Justice Brennan labeled the majority's reasoning conclusory,
sarcastically noting that "the Court may believe that italicizing the words 'immunity from
suit' clarifies its rationale." He argued that "the evils suggested by the Court [do not] pose a
significant threat," expressed Kenyatta-like confidence in trial judges' abilities to identify
insubstantial claims, and suggested greater use of § 1292(b) as an alternative. Id. at 2829-31
(Brennan, J., dissenting in part); see infra notes 237-50 and accompanying text (discussing
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) certification).
Justice Brennan also expressed "fear that today's decision will give government officials
a potent weapon to use against plaintiffs, delaying litigation endlessly with interlocutory
appeals. The Court's decision today will result in denial of full and speedy justice to those
plaintiffs with strong claims on the merits and a relentless and unnecessary increase in the
caseload of the appellate courts." 105 S. Ct. at 2831 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
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The Court held that the denial of summary judgment also satisfied the other two 20 6 criteria for the collateral order exception.
First, denial of qualified immunity "conclusively determine[s] the
disputed question" no matter which version of the facts of a case
the trial court accepts at summary judgment. If the court accepts
the facts as asserted by the defendant, nothing in the subsequent
course of the case will change the court's ruling on the immunity
issue. Alternatively, the court may rule that, accepting the plaintiff's asserted facts, the defendant is not immune. If the plaintiff
later fails to prove those facts, the court has "finally and conclusively determine[d] the defendant's claim of right not to stand
trial on the plaintiff's allegations. ' 20 7 Second, the Court held that a
summary judgment denial satisfies the requirement that the appealed issue be separate from the merits because a claim of qualified immunity is "conceptually distinct from the merits of the
plaintiff's claim" that the defendant official has violated his
rights.2 08 Furthermore, any "factual overlap" between the two issues is no more than a court would find in absolute immunity
cases.

20 9

206. As in other cases in which the Court has held an issue appealable, the Court
deemphasized the "important issue" criterion, here to the point of never mentioning the
Livesay formulation at all. In describing the general criteria for appeal as a collateral order,
the Court cited the Cohen formulation, see supra note 159, but omitted Cohen's separate
statement concerning the desirability of "a serious and unsettled question," see supra note
185. Cf. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985) (analyzing appealability of
an order denying attorney disqualification using all four Livesay criteria; court decided case
two days before Mitchell).
The Court did describe absolute immunity for the attorney general as an "important
[issue] we have hitherto left unanswered" and explained that the Court took certiorari on
the appealability issue because of the intercircuit split. 105 S. Ct. at 2812; see supra notes
167-74 and accompanying text. The Court, nonetheless, did not deal explicitly with the "important issue" criterion.
207. 105 S. Ct. at 2816. Justice Brennan, dissenting, did not address the issue of finality because he considered denial of qualified immunity to be neither "completely separate
from the merits" nor "effectively unreviewable from a final judgment." Id. at 2825 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Livesay, 437 U.S. at 468).
208. 105 S. Ct. at 2816 (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 2817 & n.10. In dissent, Justice Brennan said the application of this criterion should result in the "straightforward preclusion" of interlocutory appeals. He argued
that the Court had substituted "for the traditional test of completely separate from the
merits a vastly less stringent analysis of whether the allegedly appealable issue is not identical to the merits." Id. at 2826-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
The new "toothless standard" disserved the purposes underlying the separability requirement and would result in "repetitious appellate review" of closely related issues. Id. at 282728 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
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(3) Implications of Mitchell
Mitchell v. Forsyth establishes a clear rule on immediate appealability of some qualified immunity denials, but the decision's
sweep may be more limited than first appears. First, the case concerned only a claim for damages; 10 the plaintiff brought no claim
for injunctive relief. The Court noted that it expressed "no opinion"21 1 on a Fourth Circuit rule2" 2 that denial of qualified immunity is not appealable when plaintiff has claims for injunctive relief
that must be adjudicated at trial regardless. 21 3 Defendant officials
going to trial anyway on an injunctive claim have a weaker argument that absence of appeal on their defeated claim for immunity
would vitiate their Harlow-given freedom from burdensome trial or
discovery. Section 1983 and Bivens cases commonly contain claims
for both injunctive relief and damages. 1 4
The second limitation of the Mitchell holding is its emphasis
on the "purely legal" nature of the appealable issue.2 15 The Court
concluded: "[A] district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an ap210. Plaintiff Forsyth did still have an outstanding claim for damages under 18 U.S.C.
2520, to which qualified immunity does not attach. See Respondent's Brief in Opposition
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985). The Court did
not comment on this outstanding claim.
211. Id. at 2812 n.5.
212. See England v. Rockefeller, 739 F.2d 140 (4th Cir. 1984); Bever v. Gilbertson, 724
F.2d 1083 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 349 (1984). A strong dissent in Bever noted that
this holding might induce plaintiffs to add frivolous injunctive claims routinely to defeat
possible appeals of qualified immunity denials. 724 F.2d at 1091 (Hall, J., dissenting); see
also Tubessing v. Arnold, 742 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1984) (permitting appeal despite outstanding claim for injunctive relief).
213. Whether Mitchell's characterization of qualified immunity as "immunity from
suit" could lead to the decisions application to injunctive claims is conjectural. The law
appeared to be settled that qualified immunity protects officials only from damages, not
from injunctive relief. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 314-15 n.6 (noting that "immunity from damages does not ordinarily bar equitable relief as well"); Gannon v. Daley, 561 F.
Supp. 1377, 1387 n.27 (N.D. 11. 1983) (collecting lower court cases). But cf. Harlow, 457 U.S.
at 819 n.34 ("We emphasize that our decision applies only to suits for civil damages....
We express no view as to the conditions in which injunctive or declaratory relief might be
available.").
In Adams v. Jasinski, 105 S. Ct. 3518 (1985) (mem.), vacating and remanding 745 F.2d
70 (11th Cir. 1984), the Court remanded denial of qualified immunity to the Eleventh Circuit "for further consideration in light of" the decision in Mitchell. In Adams, interestingly,
plaintiff has an outstanding claim for injunctive relief. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4
n.2, Adams.
214. A WESTLAW sampling of qualified immunity cases qualitatively confirms this
observation.
215. 105 S. Ct. at 2816 n.9.
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pealable 'final decision' . ... ,,
While both the Mitchell and
Harlow Courts have characterized the new objective approach to
qualified immunity as "essentially" legal,2 17 the lower courts may
have more trouble fitting this concept to the facts of specific
cases. 218 At the least, some defendants who claim "extraordinary
circumstances" as part of their qualified immunity defense may
not be eligible for appeal.2 19
Plaintiffs may find some solace in the Mitchell Court's suggestion that, to resolve factual disputes and thus crystallize qualified
immunity into a "purely legal" issue, district courts will need to
accept in toto one of the parties' versions of the facts. 220 The Court
implied that the courts usually should accept the plaintiffs' version.22 ' In this sense, the loss plaintiffs incurred on the appealability issue in Mitchell could produce reciprocal gains in the area of
discovery, 222 in allocation of the burden of proof,223 and in the very
characterization of the "legal" issue.224
The Court also used Mitchell to clarify earlier dictum from
Harlow225 which indicated that discovery should not take place until a court resolves the threshold issue of qualified immunity. This
approach had appeared to conflict with the usual workings of rule
56.226 After Mitchell, courts using the new approach 227 should not
216. Id. at 2817 (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 2816 ("essentially legal"); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 ("defining the limits of
qualified immunity essentially in objective terms . . . a test that focuses on the objective
legal reasonableness of an official's acts.").
218. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
219. See Kenyatta v. Moore, 744 F.2d 1179, 1185-86 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 2141 (1985), in which the Fifth Circuit used this as an alternative ground for denying
the appeal. In Kenyatta the defendants had injected a "subjective" issue of fact into the
case by pleading "extraordinary circumstances" as an alternative to their principal assertion
that the relevant law was not clearly established. 744 F.2d at 1185-86.
220. Mitchell, 105 S. Ct. at 2816; see supra text at note 207. The Court apparently was
referring to the usual procedure on a motion to dismiss or on summary judgment when the
plaintiff is the nonmovant. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
221. Mitchell, 105 S. Ct. at 2816-17 n.9.
222. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (accepting plaintiff's factual assertions in lieu of permitting discovery).
223. See supra notes 134-45 (noting that even if plaintiff has the burden, if the issue is
a legal one with the facts assumed, the burden is less weighty).
224. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
225. 457 U.S. at 818; see supra note 22.
226. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text (discovery preceding summary
judgment).
227. The Court's pertinent dictum was:
Unless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a
defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery. Even if the plaintiff's complaint adequately alleges the commission
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allow discovery until plaintiff survives a qualified immunity claim
on a motion to dismiss; on this motion the court should assess the
adequacy of the plaintiff's claim to a violation of clearly established law by assuming the facts as asserted by the plaintiff. If the
defendants raise the issue of qualified immunity on a motion for
summary judgment, however, the court should use the customary
rule 56 approach. The court should scrutinize the appropriate
materials in the record 22 8 to determine whether the facts are in dispute229 and whether the court, as a matter of law, should or should
not issue the judgment. After Mitchell, therefore, the Court appears to contemplate discovery before summary judgment for qualified immunity cases in a way the Harlow Court had hoped to
avoid.23 0 Thus, defendants seeking to avoid burdensome discovery
may need to raise claims of qualified immunity in a rule 12(b)(6)
motion at the outset of the case."' l
The final limitation on the impact of Mitchell could come if
the decision results in a flood of appeals to the circuit courts. 232
Some appellate courts might view denial of qualified immunity as
an "important" issue the first few times a case reaches them. However, given the volume of civil rights litigation at both the district
and appellate court levels, and given the frequency of qualified immunity claims2 33 the courts could quickly lose patience with the
of acts that violated clearly established law, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to
whether the defendant in fact committed those acts.
105 S. Ct. at 2816 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
228. "The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue. . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). For fuller text, see supra note 71.
229. There should be "no genuine issue as to any material fact." FED. R. Cxv. P. 56(c);
see supra notes 207, 220 and accompanying text.
230. Of course, this approach does not mean that the Mitchell Court was endorsing
discovery into the defendants' state of mind. The permitted discovery should be limited to
"whether the defendant in fact committed those acts," not whether he possessed preHarlow subjective good faith. Harlow, 105 S. Ct. at 2816. The Mitchell Court's approach,
however, apparently tolerates subjective discovery aimed at determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text; see also supra
notes 89-92 and accompanying text (discussing proposals to control exaggerated pleading by
plaintiffs).
231. A court, of course, has the discretion to treat a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as
a rule 56 motion for summary judgment if "matters outside the pleading are presented to
the court." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
...
232. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 3, 4 and accompanying text. A WESTLAW search on Aug. 24,
1985, revealed 296 cases in the United States district courts and 206 cases in the courts of
appeal after Harlow in which qualified immunity was a summary judgment issue.
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issue and insist 234 that a case present the higher standard of a "serious and unsettled question." ' Routinely deciding that qualified
immunity denials are appealable could impair judicial efficiency by
fragmenting the course of litigation in the district courts and by
substantially increasing the caseload of the appellate courts.2 3
(b) Certified Interlocutory Appeal as a Superior Alternative
An alternative means of appeal for officials denied qualified
immunity lies in seeking certification for interlocutory appeal by
the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 37 Appeal under this
234. See Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, 455 F.2d
770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting importance of whether a decision "will settle a point once
and for all... or will open the way for a flood of appeals concerning the propriety of a
district court's ruling on the facts of a particular suit"); Donlon Indus. v. Forte, 402 F.2d
935, 937 (2d Cir. 1968) (considering "whether. . .an appellate decision will settle the matter not simply for the case in hand but for many others"); see also Phillips, The Appellate
Review Function:Scope of Review, 47 LAw & CONTMP.PROBS. 1, 2 (1984) (discussing corrective and preventive functions of appellate reivew).
235. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742 (1982) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. at 546). Clear authority, however, has developed for not permitting
appeals in cases when the right is "admitted or clear" and only an application of settled law
to specific facts is at issue. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 547 (quoted more fully at note 185).
236. See Forsyth, 729 F.2d at 274 (permitting appeals would "open the sluices to a
flood of interlocutory appeals crushing us") (quoting Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 700 F.2d 104,
110 (3d Cir. 1983) (opinion sur grant of stay) (Sloviter, J., dissenting)); see also McCree,
supra note 4, at 781-82 & n.3 (per-judge caseload in courts of appeal has increased even
more than in district courts); supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (discussing policies
of final decision rule).
The Mitchell Court heard conflicting arguments from the parties regarding the effect of
immediate appealability. The government argued that concerns about appellate caseload
were misplaced. No federal defendant, and only one state defendant, had taken an immediate appeal in the D.C. and Eighth Circuits in the periods that followed the cases granting
defendants that right. Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Mitchell v. Forsyth (citing Evans v.
Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1983) and McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir.
1982)). Plaintiff's attorneys replied that the government's information on the D.C. Circuit
was "meaningless" because the information concerned only federal defendants; plaintiff's
attorneys predicted that a large number of state defendants who sued under § 1983 would
appeal for the delay value alone. Brief for the Respondent at n.11, Mitchell v. Forsyth.
237. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982). This statute provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order ... : Provided, however, that application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in
the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof
shall so order.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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statutory exception is more limited than under section 1291; lower
courts do not stay proceedings automatically during pendency of
the appeal, and the application of the exception requires the discretionary approval of both the district and circuit courts. 3 8 In order to qualify, the order must (1) involve a "controlling question of
law," for which there is (2) "substantial ground for difference of
opinion," and (3) immediate appeal should be capable of "materially advanc[ing]" the "ultimate termination of the litigation." ' 9
Although application of these principles by the district courts has
been somewhat uneven,240 under certain circumstances denial of
qualified immunity after Harlow would appear to satisfy each of
the criteria.
Under the post-Harlow objective standard for qualified immunity, the issue would be one primarily of law.24 1 If there were important unresolved issues of fact, the court could deny certification.242 The qualified immunity issue probably would be
"controlling" because of the substantial impact it would have on
the course of the litigation. 24 The requirement that there be "substantial ground for difference of opinion" safeguards Harlow's goal
of the early elimination of possibly insubstantial claims,2 44 and appeal would "materially" advance the termination of the litigation if
the appellate court reversed the lower court's denial of qualified
immunity. Indeed, the legislative history describes a category of
cases illustrating these criteria that aptly fits qualified immunity:
238. Id.
239. Id. See generally Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HAav. L. Rlv. 607 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Note, Interlocutory
Appeals).
240. See Note, Interlocutory Appeals, supra note 239, at 630. One problem has been
that some courts have interpreted the legislative history to certify only cases involving "exceptional circumstances." See id. at 625-28. The Supreme Court appeared to endorse this
view in dicta in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978).
241. See supra notes 49-51, 167-68 and accompanying text.
242. See Kenyatta v. Moore, 744 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Bever v. Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 349 (1984). Trial courts denied certification in both cases. In Bever plaintiff also had an unresolved claim for injunctive relief. See
supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text (noting that Bever court also denied collateral
order exception under § 1291).
243. This "would seem, at a minimum, to require that reversal result in an immediate
effect on the course of the litigation and in some saving of resources either to the court
system or to the litigants." Note, Interlocutory Appeals, supra note 239, at 618. Some
courts have treated the "controlling question" requirement as a subspecies of the "materially advance. . . the litigation" requirement. See 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
75, T 110.22(2), at 260.
244. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
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"cases where a long trial would be necessary for the determination
of liability or damages upon a decision overruling a defense going
to the right to maintain the action.

' 24 5

The D.C. Circuit suggested, before Mitchell v. Forsyth, that
section 1292(b) certification is a "particularly appropriate" way to
deal with the immediate appeal of a summary judgment denial of
motions for qualified immunity. 246 Although Mitchell assures appeal under section 1291 for damages-only cases when the qualified
immunity issue is "essentially" legal,24 7 there may be a substantial
number of cases still not qualifying under section 1291 that would
meet the section 1292(b) criteria. These would be cases seeking
both damages and an injunction as well as cases posing recurring
24
legal issdes. 1
Section 1292(b) would place defendants seeking appeal under
the thumb of the same district court that already has held against
them on the merits of the issue appealed. Courts, however, should
be able to recognize cases involving close calls on which there is
"substantial" ground for a difference of opinion.24 9' Nevertheless,
defendants arbitrarily denied appeal under section 1292(b) might
have no further recourse. Courts generally have held that neither
appeal under section 1291 nor a writ of mandamus is available to
parties who have been refused section 1292(b) certification. 250
A final means by which an official denied qualified immunity
might obtain immediate appellate review is by pendent appellate
jurisdiction. 51 If a defendant appealed an otherwise unappealable
245. H-R. RP. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958).
246. McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 316 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Evans v.
Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1983). One commentator has made an analogous suggestion that courts permit appeals from otherwise unreviewable discovery orders. See 9
MoOmE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 75, 110-13(2), at 156-57 (suggesting a "liberal construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)").
247. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 210-14, 232-36 and accompanying text.
249. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982).
250. See Note, Interlocutory Appeals, supra note 239, at 633-34 & n.11; see also
supra note 157 (extraordinary nature of writ of supervisory mandamus). This rather harsh
attitude toward parties whom the court refuses § 1292(b) certification appears to flow from
the policy underlying the statute's enactment into law in 1958. One commentator has described this policy as one "exclusively" of judicial efficiency, with no account taken of possible hardship to parties, whose interests are given weight in § 1291 appeals. See Note, Interlocutory Appeals, supra note 239, at 611.
251. The Supreme Court has neither expessly approved nor disapproved this practice.
Compare Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 663 (1977) (disapproving pendent appellate
jurisdiction in a criminal case) with Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282,
287 (1940) (exercising pendent jurisdiction, in a civil case, over an otherwise unappealable
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summary judgment motion for qualified immunity together with,
for example, an appealable denial of a motion for absolute immunity,252 after assuming jurisdiction of the absolute immunity issue,
a reviewing court could exercise its discretion in the name of judi2 53
cial economy to review the qualified immunity issue as well.
IV. CONCLUSION

The courts have yet to fashion the optimum procedural means
to implement the substantive policies of Harlow v. Fitzgerald.
Courts may best maintain Harlow's desired balance between protecting constitutional rights and avoiding disruption of effective
government by harmonizing Harlow's goal of early termination of
insubstantial claims with the policies underlying the pretrial procedures invoked. When appropriate, the courts should permit limited
discovery into an official's subjective state of mind in order to
identify the relevant factual circumstances of a constitutional violation or the basis for a defendant's "extraordinary circumstances"
defense.2 54 Harlow's adoption of an objective standard for qualified
immunity justifies shifting to the plaintiff the burden of persuading the court that the law protecting his rights was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, as long as the court does
not place undue limits on his discovery of inaccessible facts. 55 Finally, even after Mitchell v. Forsyth, courts should not allow officials denied qualified immunity on a motion for summary judgment in cases that include claims for injunctive relief to appeal
automatically under the collateral order exception to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. Their rights to be "free from trial" are not at issue because
trial is inevitable on the injunctive claim. Moreover, courts can
protect adequately the defendants' right to be free of the burdens
that insubstantial lawsuits impose by an enhanced use of certification of interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).256
In fashioning a coherent framework for the effectuation of the
Harlow policies, courts should be sensitive to possible interactions
among factors common to these several procedural devices. For exdenial of a motion to dismiss).
252. This is not uncommon in § 1983 and Bivens cases. See Forsyth v. Kleindienst,
729 F.2d at 269.
253. See Metlin v. Palestra, 729 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1984) (exercising pendent appellate
jurisdiction over qualified immunity question).

254. See supra notes 68-98 and accompanying text.
255.

See supra notes 131-45 and accompanying text.

256. See supra notes 167-250 and accompanying text.
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ample, a party's access to discovery may influence allocation of the
burden of proof, and vice versa.25 Similarly, characterization or
classification of factual issues may affect the range of permissible
discovery, 258 allocation of the burden of proof,25 9 and appealability
of summary judgment denial. 260 Finally, the procedural stage of
the litigation may influence the court's formulation of the substantive legal proposition at issue in the qualified immunity claim.2 61
Careful attention to this procedural framework can provide a fair
and efficient means to effectuate Harlow's substantive adjustment
to the law of qualified immunity.
EDMUND
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